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## REPRESENTATION, REPRESENTATIVENESS AND "NON-REPRESENTATIONAL " ART

CHARLES ALTIERI

Kasimir Malevich spoke of his Suprematism as offering a mode which "represents the signs of a force " and of his representing "the energies of black and white" so that they serve "to reveal the forms of action." Piet Mondrian made similar statements about representing "balanced relations ... which are the purest representation of universality, of the harmony and unity which are inherent characteristics of the mind." <sup>1</sup> If we were to take such statements as naive or desparate evocations of neo-Platonist spiritualism, we would have a good deal of company among art historians. But we would ignore both the distinctive conceptual intelligence of these artists and the challenge they offer us to develop a concept of representation capacious enough to incorporate what we usually consider as "presentational " strategies. The aesthetics developed as a response to these presentational features -- in Suzanne Langer, in the British tradition inaugurated by Fry and Bell, and even in much Heideggerean discourse about immanence (some of it mine) will not suffice in itself. At best it pertains only to the Romantic heritage. And while it explains immediacy of response and the effects of form, it has no interpretive category for the various rhetorical aspects which distance us from what is presented and guide our interpretive reflections on it.

It is thus all too obvious that neither conventional ideas of representation nor of presentation will suffice as a general account of art's powers to implicate extra-textual dimensions of experience. Both concepts, I think, are too concerned with the direct relation between signs and world -- either as resemblance or as direct experience. I shall propose instead a rhetorical view which emphasizes the self-conscious use of signs as mediations defined by possible uses, some of which

involve conventional representation, others conventional presentation. Both uses share at least one basic function: they invite an audience to identify with some feature of the work, on its mimetic or on its authorial level, so that the work can be experienced as representative. The representative work is one that exemplifies in a way that allows members of an audience to see that each of them can participate in the life of the work while recognizing that the same possibility holds for others. Kant saw this state as the image art gives of the moral order, but I will be content if it helps us avoid the mental cramps that develop when we strain to see art always in a two term, work—referent model. If I am correct, the theory of representation makes sense as a comprehensive theory of art so long as we recall the connection of mimesis with rhetoric which gets lost once philosophy develops empiricist standards for judging the “accuracy” of a representation. Representation makes sense, and includes presentational elements, so long as we take a rhetorical stance equating representation with the way a work becomes representative for an audience connecting it to some area of experience.

I understand “representation” as a use of signs to “make present” phenomena from which the sign differs and yet, in and as its difference, confers certain characteristics on the phenomenon or places it in a set of practices. A flag does not represent a flag, but it can represent a nation or, in another register, a kind of cloth. Exemplifications are representations because they alter the mode of presence --they use particulars to elicit a sense of class terms not typically associated with the entity. Theories of representation are theories of how the sign which differs from what it represents can take on that additional signification, how it can be itself and also a figure within a larger practice. Those influenced primarily by empiricist theory, even if not in its cruder “pictorial” models of the sign, will define that signification primarily in terms of resemblance, or how the sign stands for a phenomenon. My rhetorical approach must also treat this standing for relationship, but it subordinates the static parameters typically invoked to define resemblance to concerns based on possible use values. Thus, acting for becomes in my view a more inclusive and more flexible class of relations than standing for. This is why representativeness, a condition of actions and examples, strikes me as a concept that can subsume what is valuable about representation theory. Thus I shall try to understand the representativeness of art as a process, within our cultural practices, whereby we are invited to identify with a variety of stances -- from simulacra of experience projected within the mimetic level of a text, to conditions “representing” possible worlds, to the overall attitude displayed on the authorial level as the work’s most comprehensive compositional purposiveness.<sup>2</sup> We then can treat “uptake” as a matter of reflecting on the possible use of what is represented or exemplified in a text, whether or not it fits present criteria of “truth.” Representation and presentation lose their oppositional qualities and become means

to the same end, while the emphasis on possible worlds provides a theoretical space for understanding why art as exemplification has so often been considered a means of instruction or vehicle for idealization. So long as we remain, however covertly, obsessed with the "truth" of art as in some sense documentary of external states of affairs, plausible psychology, or realms of ideal universals, we will find its engagement in projection and idealization an embarrassment. 3 A rhetorical concept of representativeness, on the other hand, fits precisely these desires of art works to extend beyond the boundaries of the specific action they display. Such extensions need not involve truth claims and a hypothetico—deductive model of inquiry, yet they do allow us to speak of several modes of possible significance. The old dichotomy between referential ideas of representation and aestheticist models of autonomy is not our only framework.

## II

I shall use as the vehicle for my arguments a visual example, Malevich's "Suprematist Composition: Red Square and Black Square" because what significance the work has clearly eludes both representational and formalist, aestheticist categories. We need the terms of presentational aesthetics, but they do not suffice for the intellectual and affective complexity inherent in Malevich's simplicity of surface. Because my concerns are theoretical, I shall treat the painting schematically and shall somewhat simplify, although I hope not distort, Malevich's intentions. 4 Moreover, my reading will be perhaps excessively "literary," but the painting invites such thematizing. I by no means assume that other non—iconic works sustain the same style of inquiry, but I do consider my arguments about mind, movement and elements metaphors for what takes place in Kandinsky as musical notation of color and in Mondrian as the relation of literal forces held in balance. All the major first generation non—iconic painters sought ways of making art embody the sensuality of mind while insisting that as act of mind the very processes objectified retained what Malevich called a principle of non—objectivity. What draws us to the elements leads us to an elemental sense of force and movement no materialist language can describe or account for.

If we provisionally treat the painting in three conceptual stages, we will be able to see just how this movement emerges and signifies as "representation" of "the forms of action." The first stage consists of a series of dynamic principles all involved in subverting a potential domination of black. Imagine this work upside down. Everything would achieve rest in the black square and all the movement and openness would be negated.

Here, instead, everything denies resolution by that single shape. As the eye moves downward to the conventional place of rest it finds sharp contrast and reversal. The smaller square is by far the more active because its tilt denies the coordinates established by the black square while its primary color leaps forward from the canvas. The tilt, in turn, opens out into white space and it asserts, in its small but almost weightless presence, a powerful refusal to echo the black squares echoing the shape of the picture frame. The red's projection forward is duplicated then by its horizontal movement as each denies an order of repetitive form.

The very elementariness of these relations invites us to bring thematic analogues into our visual experience. Too bare to be decoration, the work must signify. And its contrasts fulfill this expectation. Thus on a second level, we reflect upon the "meaning" of the tilt. In simple movement a separate world is born. Elements themselves project intentionality because the red square introduces the possibility of the canvas enclosing more than one world: the red produces spatial coordinates which entail a different schema, a different model for processing information and relations to other phenomena. Autonomy becomes a visual experience. In fact autonomy rendered spatially becomes a remarkably complex visual experience because we see of what it is made—namely, opposition and difference. The bareness of the canvas virtually reduces to the semiotic categories of opposition that make the assertion of autonomous identity possible. For the red square to establish its force, color requires non-color, smallness a corresponding larger shape for contrast, new space an old set of coordinates, singleness duality, and freedom or difference a sense of imminent norms and perhaps immanent oppression.

All these forces, we must remember, are at once extremely abstract and yet absolutely literal. Our thematic reflections do not depend on some virtual drama interpreted from the painting but simply describe the force of a concrete set of relations staged as art and hence as inviting us to reflect upon what they can be said to display. Thus, on a third level the painting can be seen as directly addressing the idea of what sustains and grounds the relations and the reflections they allow. But I have been too abstract to capture the significance of these meta-reflections. We must attend to the range of lyrical effects created by the specific way the red square tilts. Visually it at once leads us out to the surrounding white space and, by that relation, creates or restores a delicate balance with the very figure of order whose demands for repetition it had denied. In studying theosophy Malevich also learned the dynamics of Hegelian logic. By negating one form of order, the black square's, the red tilt makes the eye seek out larger contexts. In these contexts we recover a new balance; indeed we recover a new principle of balance. Instead of balance based on repetition of shape, we have a balance that in or as movement integrates all the diverse elements. The very pull among the competing coordinates

and forms literally produces a sense of their interdependence, while that interdependence has as its ground the white space of canvas. This ground, like the mind and like infinite space, holds all by allowing what is held to become manifest as force and as relationship: "Tranquility itself is defined by movement." <sup>5</sup>

I allow myself the luxury of citing Malevich because statements like these justify taking such complex presentations of balancing force as thematic, that is as self-conscious figurings of how the painter can understand the powers he has practiced or brought into being. Here the very process of reading this painting in levels allows us to reflect on the strange ontological properties of its elements. Because there is nothing virtual about the painting, it can be said to signify nothing beyond itself. It simply is—as a structure of shapes, colors, and movements. We cannot read these as means intended to represent or stand for something else. Yet as we meditate on the painting, we also cannot treat its literalness as simply physical. What we see, what is only physical form and movement, nonetheless grows in sense, so that sense itself becomes an elemental condition bridging mental and physical. At each level of the painting, its elements signify while never taking any of the allegorical or representational forms of our typical signifying codes. It is as if we were in the presence of a pure form of signification—of the mind in elements and elements in mind—which needs no specific structure of representations. One might say that Malevich sought a form of meaning or something like a Kantian schema which captured semantic force without any of the positivities of semantic content which are subject to historical displacements. <sup>6</sup> The meaning of this painting is simply its structure as a force. Yet its force involves both the series of physical movements we have been discussing and the process of mental movements that recover that literal force. I border here on mysticism, on Malevich's "meaning," so perhaps the best I can do is offer a simple emblem for what I am trying to say about sense in spirit and spirit in the literalness of sense. We must be spiritually moved by the painting in order to experience its physical movement as fully present in its elemental concreteness. Change and meaning become conditions of reappropriating the life in what we normally see only as already constituted for interpretive sight. Now we are asked to step back and reflect upon the mystery of sense in sensation and the sensation of sense.

As we step back, two further figural extension of these movements appear possible. They will not be necessary for my argument, but they should help extend its analogical force, so I will briefly indulge in spelling them out. Malevich, we know, desired to produce through paintings a condition of non-objectivity where art captures permanent conditions of "spiritual"



force. As one version of the non-objective, consider again the nature of the tilt which breaks repetition, creates new coordinates of sense, and opens the possibility and necessity of new forms of balance or coherence among conflicting forces. The tilt itself can be equated with a fundamental force of differentiation, itself never locatable except in the movement it imposes by making us seek new balances. I allude, of course, to Derrida. But here a picture is worth a thousand philosophers: the visual example enables us to see what Derrida imagines -- indeed what all thinkers of the self as negation from Hegel to Sartre have imagined. The principle of autonomy is in essence a principle of tilt, of the possibility of new coordinates of desire and interpretation entering on objective, cognitive world. The analytic philosopher and conceptual artist John Perry provides a concrete basis for such attributions in his indexical definitions of self. Self, in my somewhat reductive version of his argument, is not a property agents possess but a function or condition of experience whereby the use of the indexical "I" makes possible "a crossing of life and cognition." <sup>7</sup> The "I" takes up the world from a point of view: the world does not change but the investments it allows and sustains do. We approximate here Lacan's "imaginary," that is an inescapable source of erotic energies and of an ego ideal/ideal ego which has, in effect, no content but can be characterized as a demand to produce investments allowing an agent to make identifications within positions he occupies in language.

If this tilt will figure the self as a principle of difference, if it figures the imaginary, will it not also present (or represent) the nature of the art work itself in its non-objectivity? The movement of sense and signification is insistently physical, yet entirely dependent on the painting as an organizing point of view. The objects as they take meaning here cannot be substituted for, even though each element is infinitely reproducible. So in their very affirmation of objective sense, the force of this painting in balance insists also on their non-objectivity or untranslatableability. The painting is at once within the world and not congruent with it -- as is perhaps indicated by the way my attempts at critical description border on the parodic. Roland Barthes coined the concept of textualite in order to indicate how certain relations in an art work resist all naturalizing interpretations. Malevich's point is more general: even what invites figural elaboration in its ideal specificity as a locus of self-generated forces and stimulus to audience meditation remains ineluctably different from all our efforts to appropriate it. The art work must, to be an art work, retain its own control over the coordinates that generate its sense of sense.



I must now face my own problem of representativeness. How does so obviously an extreme example allow us to make generalizations on the subject of representation in art? On one level the challenge is clear: Malevich's stylistic strategies are presentational while his language for them is representational. So he focuses the question of how we can correlate presentational elements -- the signifying force of what art works display in or as actions or movements -- with representational elements that allow the work to stand for non-aesthetic properties of experience. The problem is complicated, however, by the fact that we do not normally govern our critical practice by clear and distinct ideas of either presentational or representational elements. Yet the practices betray biases and assumptions that are often reductive in what they take as central and problematic in the links they draw between art and the world. I hope, then, to use my reading of force and exemplification in Malevich as a way of bringing to the surface confusions or limitations of the assumptions often underlying representational theories. As these become clear, we will see why deconstruction seems so appealing an alternative, but from a perspective which I think can lead us to concepts not so dependent upon the oppositions deconstruction feeds upon. My intention is not to refute deconstruction (one does not refute a practice) but to show how it is one limited way of serving the end I call representativeness.

We must ask first what views of representation are incompatible with Malevich's work and the modernist strategies it typifies. Clearly the work does not picture states of affairs -- whether they be facts in the world, states of mind, or some version of universals or types. Yet while ideals of descriptive resemblance often creep into our critical practice and evaluations, they are not central to any sophisticated theory of representation in art. Gombrich's work is typical. Representation is not a matter of producing replica but of constructing salient resemblances which "suggest" or "evoke" a referent. Representation works when it "retains the efficacious nature of the prototype" because it preserves the relevant "context for action." These contexts, I take it, can be either realistic (questions of how something appears) or symbolic (questions of what universal conditions are illustrated).<sup>8</sup> From my point of view, this idea of contexts for action is an extremely promising one. But Gombrich's dislike of expressionism and of non-iconic art make it appear that he confines the idea to contexts constructed as ideas or tonal qualities of depicted worlds which pre-exist and thus authenticate the representation. Thus while Gombrich denies a simple copy theory of representation, his values, his sense of what is salient in paintings and

what authenticates them, suggests that he retains from that theory its hierarchy of fit: representations are tested by their power to evoke some truth within a culture's beliefs about the "actual" world (which can be an abstract, mythic one).

Malevich's painting challenges these assumptions primarily by the emphasis it puts on representation as itself a condition of action in the process of interpreting itself and thus of making special demands on the ways an audience understands the directions of fit between the work, its activity, and the world. More important than any state of affairs evoked or suggested by the configurations of the image is the nature of the process displayed by the work. What links to the world is less some condition symbolized than the processes displayed in the art act, which evoke qualities of mind that can transcend art. As Maurice Denis put it in one of the texts most influential in modernism's challenge to older aesthetic: our overwhelming impressions need not "emerge from the motif or the objects of nature represented, but form the representation itself, from forms and coloration."<sup>9</sup> Malevich's painting, for example, uses its non-iconic properties to make the entire work a pure display of the very energies its shapes allow us to treat as significant. Picture and picturing are correlative. And because of this the specific portrayal seems inseparable from an abstract schema exemplifying the very ideas of creativity it elicits. The painting is simultaneously a display, a metacommentary and an invitation for us to take it as a pure schematic form applicable, as shape and as movement, to a wide variety of particulars. Moreover, the work's significance lies not only in this complex presentation but also in the ordered movement of reflective discovery it invites from its audience. The control of temporal movement is a feature of artistic experience which no spatial model of resemblance will capture, especially when the sense of unfolding in time reinforces and extends the state of being displayed in the work as its authorial act. Similarly, I can imagine no way to describe in traditional theories of representation the way Malevich's work insists on its own condition as difference, at once within the physical world and negating it. Finally, theories which ignore such phenomena have great trouble explaining the way interpretation actually functions in art. If works represent states of affairs, then it makes sense to focus interpretation on the specific ways something is represented. The interpreter wants us to notice how the work treats some feature of the world and allows us to make predications about it. But, with works like Malevich's, and I think with most great works, interpretation is more Whiteheadian. Rather than emphasizing the ideas we get about objects, we treat those ideas as lures for feeling which deepen our appreciation of the specific action taking place in the entire structure of relations held in specific

tensions by the work. It is the dynamics of interpretation which constitutes a complex condition of action in relation to display, and this conjunction produces or can produce genuine originality. Such works require a theory of representation that takes into account the conditions of possibility they display and evoke. This theory will use the display function as a way of preserving the realm of meaning in the text. The invitation is not to make just any response but to fill out the configuration the text offers and to attempt identifying with it. Then, because provisional identification is possible with what the text displays or schematizes as meaning, we have a way of moving from author's meaning to the use of such meaning in possible worlds. This is a plausible measure of significance.

#### IV

Expressionist or presentational theories will explain some of these phenomena. But such theories involve serious problems of locating the source of expression--in the work or in the maker--and they repeat the same problem on the level of response. What does one do with an expression--try to repeat the original experience or emphasize one's immediate reactions to the work's expressive properties. In either case Gombrich is right to insist that expressionist theory has difficulty coming to terms with the rhetorical features of expression that, as mediations, require interpretation of structures and meanings which cannot be reduced to responses to the work's manifest qualities. As evidence for Gombrich's views, we need only note how the brilliant observations of British art historians from Roger Fry to Harold Osborne rarely produce a full semantic account of a picture's import. Similar problems plague the expressionism that extends from Dewey and Collingwood to Guy Sircello: emphasis on experience never quite coincides with a full discourse about meaning. Some Expressionist theories do isolate my central concerns--the quality of display in the art act, the power of movement in and through the work, and the understanding of interpretive fit as a relationship between examples and possible worlds. But so long as they must define their terms in sharp opposition to the reductionism that often accompanies resemblance views of representation, they are likely to lapse into psychologism or into formalism. When faced with Gerald Graff's using an ideal of representation to dismiss most literature in the Romantic tradition or with Gombrich's dislike of non-iconic art, it is tempting to base one's counter-arguments simply on the features of form or evocativeness they ignore. However, we then keep repeating the same oppositions.

For this I have a strong antidote. It may not cure, but it should help us enjoy the disease while we come to see what elements must be integrated

if there is to be a comprehensive theory of representativeness adequate to what Malevich displays. I want to spend a few moments on Jacques Derrida's analysis of how the conventional poles of presentation and representation are condemned to undermining one another's life while deferring one another's death. The following passage seems to me Derrida's most concise troping on the topic:

"A entendre le mot de Cezanne, la verite (presentation *ou* representation, dévoilement *ou* adequation ) doit etre rendue 'en peinture' soit par presentation, soit par representation, selon les deux modeles de la verite. La verite, le modele du peintre, doit etre rendue en peinture selon les deux modeles de la verite. Des lors, l'expression abyssale 'verite de la verite', celle qui aura fait dire que la verite est la non-verite, peut se croiser avec elle-meme selon toutes sortes de chiasmes, selon qu' on determinera le modele comme presentation ou comme representation. Presentation de la representation, presentation de la presentation, representation de la representation, representation de la presentation." 11

If we abstract from Derrida's playful spirit, we can see him identifying four specific problems reinforcing and paralyzing the traditional oppositions I have been speaking of -- the force of signification seems always to evade representation and yet elicit it, the artist's model of truth conflicts with her model of art, the power to claim "truth" confuses the adequacy of representations with the force of rhetoric, and the desire to represent that force creates an endless regrese of signs in search of a source they endlessly supplement and displace. The "ground" for such deconstruction appears in Wittgenstein. Where the *Tractatus* thought of representation in the pictorial form ArB, the *Philosophical Investigations* led us to view any description of such acts as entailing an agent S, a special sense of *r* in terms of the *as* or specific kind of equivalence established, and a sense of some conditions of uptake *Q* which we can treat loosely here as symbolizing all the intended effects the work may have -- on an audience and for the artist's psyche and career. Thus we need to identify in our account of representation how S ArB Q can be accomplished. Derrida points the way by contrast, for he shows that each symbol identifies a point of slippage which renders representation a problematic, but probably inescapable concept.

Let me spell out only the problem of intentionality, the condition of agency S in representation, as an example of what Derrida recognizes and what artists like Malevich grapple with. Derrida tries to make us see that intentionality cannot be the purely transcendental openness Husserl dreamed of and analytic thought tried to secure by strategies modeled on Russell's theory of types. As Sartre demonstrated, representation takes place from a position and from a desire always surpassing or placing elsewhere what it attends to. The *re* -- in representation

must be taken seriously because it calls our attention to an act of purposive presentation inseparable from the desired process of impersonal description. The S will prove never a neutral observer's stance, but instead will combine roles of projection and depiction. And this means that the entire representational process will always be at once overdetermined ( by the force of presentation ) and undetermined ( by carrying insufficient evidence for deciding on the tasks the representation is actually intended to do ). Understanding art as the imitation of models confuses ideals of description and of constructing works of art that satisfy aesthetic standards, and the pursuit of truth demands rhetorical efforts to displace other, dominant versions of the subject.

These problems are not merely epistemological delicacies teased out of the tantalizing ambiguity between subjective and objective genitive in the expression "sign of." Rather they implicate many of the emotional issues of the relation between positions and descriptions which one might say has become the central topic of contemporary thought. Political cases of representation most clearly illustrate the complexity, for example in what might be called the dilemma of politician in a representative government.<sup>12</sup> We expect standing for and acting for to be congruent features of representation: the politician should manage in a disinterested way to act on behalf of interests which are in effect objectively determined by elections. Yet even deciding whom she represents involves two models-- the empirical or actual interests of their constituents and the "real" or ideal interests that in her best judgment serve the "true" public interest. Yet the choice of whom to represent is very difficult to separate from how the representer's interests might at once be served and remain hidden. Whom she represents depends on what self she chooses or needs to present, and that need may in turn involve representations which mask it.

We might put the same case in more general terms by saying that treatments of representation by thinkers as Foucault, Derrida, and Goffman conceive descriptions as more "like" letters of recommendation, than like accounts conventionally idealized as scientifically objective. They see idealization and description as interdependent, and thus as generating conflicting notions of truth. Consider as a philosophical parable the case of the student who asked a famous professor for a letter of recommendation but was told he could have only a letter of description. In this parable the object, the social practice, and the representing force are all at odds, and each has a different interest in the process of description. The professor wants his authority properly represented in his act, so he hopes that his picture will reflect his (idealized) character by showing how he refuses to idealize at least this student. (For many of us all our descriptions of



our students have qualities of recommendation because they are our students and "must" represent something of us.) Yet the professor's "honesty" in one dimension becomes dishonesty in others—not simply because another fantasy shapes the presenting energy but also because the refusal to recommend can be more severely marked as negative by the institutional "model" (everybody writes "recommendations") than the agent intends in picturing his "model." Finally, consider the poor candidate for description, cast in his powerlessness as merely an object not worth the effort to falsify which guarantees the "truth" of the message. He experiences the painful vulnerability of having to recognize that description may not capture his "truth," but instead is, from his point of view, distorted by the very authorial act which should guarantee his distinctiveness.

## V

Given the luscious ambiguities in concepts like representation and mimesis, it is not easy to say why we should not simply trace their various ways of folding into and displacing one another. Here, by what Geoffrey Hartman calls reading against the text, we can even construct a benign deconstruction that preserves one form of the complexity of spirit. Yet such a choice would condemn us to leaving unexplored two significant alternatives. If we assume that artists honored by our traditions are generally wiser than most of their critics, of whatever persuasion, it is likely that we will see the problems, and perhaps even possible solutions, more fully if we read with or read *through* the text than if we read against it. Certainly Malevich's tilt reflects a profound meditation on precisely these problems of understanding how art can "represent" its own presentational force. Thus, second, it might be possible to construct from such art works, a view of the concept of representation capacious enough to preserve the vitality and complexity of fascinating fields of play like Derrida's without itself being so thoroughly subject to the endless play of vacillating oppositions. Perhaps one can see presentation and representation, or idealization and description less as oppositions than as complementary ways of pursuing a single end. Such an account can also have an important historical dimension because it should be able to explain why presentational aesthetics developed precisely at the time when the tension between the idealizing and descriptive features of representation could no longer be concealed by Symbolic and mythic strategies.

I wish to show that a rhetorical view of representation as representativeness can accomplish such a reconciliation. First, we must distinguish representation as a

question of how the mind relates to the world from the specific conditions of art where signs stand in what can be a culturally grounded relationship to a sense of realities outside, beyond, or through the work. 13 In this latter context, representation can be a matter of representativeness—not a function of how signs project resemblance to states of affairs but a surrogate inviting an audience to take it as something to be identified with by projecting a possible world. The work uses aesthetic conventions to focus attention on the process of provisionally identifying with the stances, movements or qualities of perception it constructs, so that one can reflect on how they might relate to a variety of existential conditions. The signs in art must still stand for some elements of ordinary experience, but the idea of invitation puts the emphasis on how they act for or act as what they elicit. Malevich's force depends on our accepting the work as potentially schematic, and hence as a set of condition of action or relation we all share. When we ask "schematic of what," we begin to see that art works often reverse the normal standing—for—acting for relationship we find in politics. To the extent that art works exemplify new configurations, we project what they stand for largely by construing how they act. And acting for is not a relation to an already existing community but a relation to a community one projects through the construction of a world one can identify with. 14

Representativeness can be a property of any features of the work which allow projective identifications. Nonetheless, the fullest constructed world will obviously be created by our putting together the entire art symbol as a hierarchical organization of meanings. By identifying the authorial stance we establish the richest parameters for identifications. Thus, a novel like *Anna Karenina* represents on one level the possible feelings of an adulteress, on another a complex stance towards domesticity and self-discipline. If one follows up on my comments to ask what specific condition of acting for takes place in "Red Square and Black Square," one begins to get at the profound metaphysical shift Malevich inaugurated and the complexity of what I call critical situating required to get at this shift. As pure elemental relations, the painting acts for some transpersonal shapes and movements which in their materiality implicate and display conditions of creative intentionality set in the process of a self-contextualizing balance.

The most important achievement of this definition is that it avoids all temptations to collapse the epistemological force of art into any single relation of resemblance or standing for some existing state of affairs. And that means dispelling the myth of foundationalism for literature. I take as my motto for

representativeness Wallace Stevens dictum: "The measure of the poet is the measure of his sense of the world and of the extent to which it involves the sense of other people." <sup>15</sup> From this we can see why various forms of realism and resemblance models of representation have strong appeal in art and in philosophy. If a description is true of a state of affairs, it is transpersonal and in effect compels us to acknowledge that it has representative force for all those who subscribe to the system of evaluation involved. Yet this view of description leaves unresolved the old bugaboo of empiricist theory: how to give a perspicuous account of questions of peripeteia and relevance or richness of fit. My view does, I think, account for this matter of the possible *force* of representations. We find them producing significant possibilities for reflecting on conditions of actions. And this view enables us to treat "realism" as having force less on descriptive than on loosely ethical or pragmatic grounds. Fidelity of resemblance matters to the extent that it can be shown to facilitate significant identifications. Graff and Lukacs are wrong in rooting a work's authority in the descriptive accuracy of its signs. Rather, the relevant question is Brecht's: what can this configuration of signs enable us to project in self-reflection about our lives, and how can it show that such identifications matter. Description is only one of many ways to connect signs and worlds, and empirical models of coherence control only some modes for appealing to representativeness.

By shifting to projective and pragmatic terms we obviously run the danger of tempting critics to impose a single "authentic ethic," just as others try to impose a single "reality." But an emphasis on identifications also allows us to specify how criticism can serve ethical ends that do not collapse into any single dogma. <sup>16</sup> By proposing as its basic value the possibility of significant identifications, my view at least implies a preference for preserving texts as different from one another and from us. Identifications grow feeble if they repeat themselves. So there are strong pragmatic grounds for insisting on principles like intentions in the text as our means of saving ourselves to some extent from projecting our own already constituted identities upon it. There are other available strategies, but, as I have suggested, the ideas of masterpieces and authority suggest that authors will do better for us the job of constructing possible worlds than we will do by critical deformations worked out according to our own powers and guidelines. Conversely the possibility of rich identification serves as a useful, if not very rigorous guideline for resolving critical knots or evaluating competing critical perspectives. The measure of a critical stance—in general and in relation to particulars—becomes how fully it allows us to recover whatever force led readers we respect (or wish to identify with) to value the work as they did. If this goal is acknowledged, the practice of criticism involves trying out various paths to this representativeness. Treating Malevich as a formalist, for example, simply blocks the possibility

of understanding how he, and we, could conceive abstraction as a philosophical drama. Some critical paths lead to dead ends or to mere repetition, others allow us to see how the elements of a work establish rich possibilities of identification. "Rich" remains a contested term, but we at least know what kind of argument we must employ to justify its use.

## VI

Once we adapt a rhetorical stance towards representativeness, we put ourselves in a position where many of the conventional oppositions lose their force, and it becomes possible to describe without endless vacillation some of the social roles art and criticism can play. We still need distinctions between representation and presentation, but since the aim is not description the two need not be in pure conflict. Both are means for achieving the same end -- possible self-conscious identifications in specific works as representative of human possibilities. Therefore, an aesthetic theory can try to combine elements of each in its overall design. Theory can hope to account for the force of expressive acts and authorial presence while also adapting itself to questions of structure and deliberate mediation hard to reconcile with presentational theories.

The process of untangling and retangling old oppositions is a complex one. Here I can only indicate some of the possibilities that I think follow from the overall shift I propose. Most important is the different attitude we are allowed to take towards the expressive or presentational force. Conventional models of representation as mimesis tend to share the distinction in analytic philosophy between propositional attitudes and the actual proposition. Only the latter easily lends itself to their principles of assessment. Similarly, mimetic theory concentrates on what the text's argument or plot captures. It is paralyzed by authorial investments which change during the course of a work or, more generally, by the action of an authorial sensibility within the structure of resemblances to the world. These are too much like letters of recommendation. If, on the other hand, we emphasize the possible representativeness of a work, the attitude or stance displayed becomes a crucial factor. What links the work to the world is less what it says than what it demonstrates itself as doing in relationship to the world. The presenting activity has representative consequences. For movement, as in Malevich, is precisely what allows the work to have force as a possible display of conditions for acting and reflecting on actions. The work can interpret the very processes of its own rhetorical construction.

My move to rhetoric only holds off Derridean oppositions on one level, although quite a significant one. What can be presented without the displacing energies of descriptive representation remains a matter of degree. Any discussion

of intentions opens on to endless regress : we can ask about intending to intend or needing to represent what is presented. Nonetheless, it is precisely against the backdrop of this regress that we can see how much the rhetorical view gains for us. So long as we must represent the presentational act in another medium, we have translation problems and undetermination that invites deconstruction. But we can still distinguish from the translational aspect of interpretation, the process by which interpretation serves simply as a means to fill out the lures for feeling engendered by the display function of the art object. As we saw in terms of the invitation in Malevich's painting, interpretation can be content with two senses of reading *through* a work. The interpreter brings dialectical pressure on the work so that its internal movements become purposive, and she tries to see through that movement what can be exemplified as a possible state of being in the world to be reflected upon. There is in principle, and as a possibility of critical practice, no need to translate the exemplified art into some overall meaning stateable in other terms. It is sufficient to identify possible ramifications in what is displayed. 17

Much depends here on the account of display one can produce for a theory of representativeness. I have discussed various features of the topic in my work on literature as performance, so I will confine myself here to two features of display made basic and coherent within the view I have been arguing. First, display becomes a prominent distinguishing feature between epistemological and rhetorical or artistic concepts of representation. In epistemology thinkers like Wittgenstein, Quine, and Rorty have argued that one can do without the concept of representation entirely.<sup>18</sup> What we need to test warrantable assertions is not some putative resemblance between pictures in the mind and facts in the world but simply some measure of how linguistic formulations effect practices. No discussion of mediation will have any authority or role to play independent of actual stimuli and results. Or to put the case the other way around, it is very difficult to imagine an account of mental representation since virtually any one will prove compatible with practical experience. So why bother with representation at all. SArB collapses into equivalence of Q. But such an account does not fit any view of art that emphasizes the specificity and ideality of the work, the state of difference it produces, or the practices of interpretation attentive to qualities not reducible to hypothetical—deductive reasoning. All these attributes depend on our concern for preserving the work as a particular idea or model to be reflected upon, and we want to locate its ideality in its capacity to exemplify as a specific configuration of experience general enough to apply to a variety of contexts. Wittgenstein elicited the distinctive sense of experience I am after in his remarks on "sameness" in



art. For example, "You *could* select either of two poems to remind you of death, say. But supposing you had read a poem and admired it, could you say : Oh, read the other, it will do the same." <sup>19</sup> If we are to have such specificity, we cannot collapse the object into a range of stimuli, equivalent for some relevant practice. This would collapse forms or ends into means and make irrelevant the artist's effort to create a type, or exemplification which is appreciated in part because it produces shareable identifications we can discuss as particular models. We need to preserve the specific shape of the mediation. What matters is not Q but the exemplification established by the SArB relation. We are concerned not with the motion Malevich's picture causes but with the distinctive qualities of the specific way the work presents relationships demonstrating and interpreting processes of balancing.

At this point it becomes necessary again to resist the temptation to treat what art picture as a description. The representational structure need not refer to existing states of affairs precisely because we preserve all of its configurational elements. The display is thus free to apply to possible situations: the work becomes an element of our grammar, not of our stock of truths. And as such an element, there is no problem with idealization or with closure. Idealization is simply built into art by virtue of the fact that it invites us to try on possible attitudes. We come to art knowing that it can project a variety of presentational modes—from pure fantasy to pure description—and a variety of ways of accounting for its own rhetoric as a means for developing the mode. Art works can be dialectical engagements with precisely the tensions Derrida articulates. But they neither need deconstruction nor deconstruct themselves because they offer themselves simply as conditions of possible identifications. Malevich, in fact, has his work exemplify precisely the condition of ideality which is the state of difference art produces in its refusal to be subsumed under any specific existential description. Yet even this has representative functions that lead beyond art, that suggest basic possible attributes in any condition of ecstasy or of intentionality.

Often the work will project both a condition of possibility and a plausible way of testing those possibilities. This I take to have been the project of many nineteenth century novelists. *Middlemarch* projects a model of reading society and human actions which in turn is imaginatively tested by its events. The book's concern, then, is less with resembling states of affairs than with inviting us to try on what the text exemplifies as an ideal in order to explore a better way of reading than we ordinarily practice. The descriptive adequacy is rhetorical means, not a thematic end. Yet we ignore this point constantly in our fear of closure by acting as if the work wanted to impose its descriptive categories as exclusive interpretive ones. It is, of course, possible and sometimes necessary to idealize counter-ideals and to exemplify attitudes devoted to

resisting the imposition of types. Yet it is equally possible and necessary to try out possible forms of totalizing interpretation. Closure, in other words, is a projected ideal to be tested as such. We can take the effort as a description and exalt it into a dogma. But we can carry anything to extremes. We come much closer to the way works project identifications if we take the effort to produce closure as simply a rhetorical, imaginative test of how far a given stance will take us. The end is not to close off other ways of reading but to project the possibilities inherent in one attitude or mode of integrative thought. To stress only resistance to closure is like reading Malevich's painting only for the tilt, without attention to its quest for a composing balance that idealizes a presentational force capable of regathering what desire sunders.

I do not intend to suggest that because art is an invitation to provisional identifications that it is culturally benign. Art has culturally constructive roles. Of this we occasionally need reminding. But all invitations have their demonic features. Representativeness, like representing, involves wills to power. But by stressing representativeness we can preserve the extensive and rich features of the work of art which function as display and allow us to judge in terms of our identifications the nature and value of the power projected. Artists can give audiences credit for recognizing and using in their own ways what gets exemplified as forms of power. There remain, of course, forms of power which are not exemplified, not self-consciously displayed by a work but hidden in it or hidden by it. Of these I can only say that a rhetorical approach to representation puts suspicion back in the right place, or at least in the dramatically most interesting place. Stanley Cavell argues that philosophy's mistake is assuming that scepticism is only a philosophical problem rather than one deeply embedded in difficulties of establishing human trust and shareable projects.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, much of modern theory errs by treating the source of suspicion in art as an epistemological condition located in signs and a problematic of description. Art's danger is far more serious—we must suspect the very condition of agency which offers the work to us as a structure of possibilities. Only by such extreme measures can we at once defend ourselves against being taken in and recognize the full joy of finding a community based on invitations that resist our attempts to discredit them. The condition of resistance is precisely the condition which allows us to surpass tests of description and to explore what imaginative identifications with a range of works will produce as criteria of judgment.

## VII

Because so much of this paper is obviously addressed to problems most pressing upon literary critics, I want to conclude by stating why Malevich

seems to me so useful a representative for my case. (I might add that if *La Verite en Peinture* is a sign, art critics will soon face the same problems their literary brethren do.) The primary connections are historical. Non-iconic painting has qualities of literalness and immediacy which allow it to exemplify better than any literary work the properties most important to the presentational aesthetics of modernism. It is fairly easy to show how these properties become important because of the painters' and poets' profound distrust of a representational heritage no longer able to hide problematic transitions between empirical descriptions, type universals, and idealizing recommendations of human powers. But my concern here is with the historical dialectic one can construct in relation to those presentational strategies. Malevich did not share my theory. There is no one less likely to have accepted a rhetorical view of art than Malevich. He saw art as compulsion not as invitation. Indeed, he accepted the dominant ideal of empiricist representation—that a structure of signs, properly fitted to the world—should and could compel universal assent. He differed from that tradition in where he located the compulsion. Aware of the duplicities inherent in description, Malevich turned to a neo-Kantian strategy. He would impose compulsion not by the force of resemblance but by producing literal schema that in themselves captured the essential truths of our mental powers of construction. Abstraction, then, seemed a form of compulsion deeper than any description because description are only historical positivities while abstraction captures what remains constant for everyone's mind in a variety of descriptions.

In this light, modernism is reduced to abstraction because its scepticism about the duplicity inherent in traditions of representation that could combine realistic and idealistic (or religious) elements forced it to take mental structures as the only possible ways of compelling representativeness. All other art forms were masked letters of recommendation. Yet in that very act of abstraction, modernists like Malevich enable us to recover what is perhaps the most typical classical attitude towards representation. From Aristotle's probable impossibles to Reynold's universals, artists and theorists rarely had to grapple with the epistemological framework that equated representation with description.<sup>21</sup> So they were free to understand representation as the production of possible schema for imaginative stances. But schema in a pre-Kantian universe are not candidates for expressing the essence of the mind so much as specific displays which can function to indicate typical possibilities of identification. The schema displayed in art works function simply as rhetorical invitations. At our culture's most self-critical and reductive moment, it may have rediscovered the ideas of art as projection which sustained its most generous and capacious spiritual ideals. And if this is even half-true, there is a good deal not to despair about in the current emergence of a variety of philosophical perspectives that replace positivist ideals of compulsion by description with invitations to explore possible worlds.

## Notes and References

1. Malevich, *Essays on Art, 1915-1928*, vol. 1, trans, Xenia Glowacki Prus and Arnold McMillen (Copenhagen: Borgen 1968), pp. 123 - 125. For Mondrian, see "Natural Reality and Abstract Reality" in Herschel B. Chipps, ed., *Theories of Modern Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 322 - 23. The best work I know on how these "representations" have "content" is Leo Steinberg *Other Criteria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 289-306 and Marcelin Pleynet, "Mondrian vingt-cinq ans apres," in his *Système de la Peinture* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1977), pp. 133 - 43. And for my understanding of specific concepts related to abstraction, I am indebted to Harold Osborne, *Abstraction and Artifice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979).
2. In using an idea of coherence, I refer simply to an attitude we take towards a text as we attempt to integrate its salient features. We may find them incoherent or a coherent analysis of incoherence, etc. I also wish to acknowledge here that some of my terms and specific formulations derive from the following lecturers at an International Association for Philosophy and Literature Meeting on the subject of Representation: Geoffrey Hartman, Linda Dittmar, William Grimes and Gerald Bruns.
3. For the best summary I know of versions of realism, which also reveal the quest for grounds of resemblance, see Marshall Brown, "The Logic of Realism: A Hegelian Approach," *PMLA* 96 (1981), 224-30.
4. I hope that this one quotation from Malevich, *Essays*, vol. 2, pp. 138-39, will suffice to indicate the general nature of his intentions:  
  
"In the case of Suprematist contrast it is the different scales of the form, i.e., the sizes ( dimensions ) of Suprematist Elements in their mutual interrelations that have the greatest significance. In this case color in no way corresponds to form like form to color, but it is only combined by means of the dimensions and scales of space...The creation of these sensations may really be an expression of the essence of phenomena in the non-objective functions of the universe.  
  
"This essence of phenomena is sensed non-objectively, since that is the nature of its reality. This reality will never be consciously realized, since the consciousness of form is contained in the object,

in something concrete, and man strives to understand it ....

"The world, which is understood by sensation is a constant world. The world which consciousness understands as a form is not constant. Forms disappear and alter, whereas sensations neither disappear nor alter. A ball, motor, aeroplane or arrow are different forms, but the sensation of dynamism is the same ....

"Thus the investigation of phenomena by purely formal method brings us to forms ...., but after that we must rely on sensation which should complete that which cannot be shown by the formal method ....

"Only the formal approach to the universe still does allow complete fusion between man and the universe.

"The formal method discovers the forms of phenomena, but not their reality or spirit ... For form, colour and spirit are phenomena with different states of energy. The total combination of their states in the universe in which my life is determined is a constant link with or in constant sensation of the spiritual aspect of the forces of the universe, both with and without image. This link in its turn calls for the activity from one which is expressed in the creation of a new phenomena; the creation of these phenomena will depend on the quality, or capacity to conceive the image, its stability will depend on the power of the imagination. Thanks to this striving there arises a mass of things that ought to determine my ideas.

5. Malevich, *The World as Non-Objectivity*. Unpublished writings, 1922–25, trans. Xenia Glowacki—Prus and Edmund Little (Copenhagen: Borgen. 1976, p. 16,)
6. Alexander Gelley uses the idea of schema to handle specific "mimetic" representations on a level more abstract than most commentators on realism do. See his "Metonymy, Schematism, and the Space of Literature" *NLH* 3 (1980), 469–88. Gelley provides a framework within which we can see non—iconic artists taking a more radical Kantian step in an already established direction of inquiry.
7. I cite from Perry's 'Perception, Action, and the Structure of Believing' forthcoming in a festschrift for Paul Grice edited by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner.
8. For Gombrich on representation, see especially "Meditation on a Hobby Horse" in *Meditation on a Hobby Horse and Other Essays on the Theory of Art* (New York: Phaidon, 1978), 1–11; and *Art and Illusion*, Princeton: Bollingen Press, 1960.) I quote from *Art and Illusion*, pp. 38, 111. I distinguish symbolic from realistic in accord with Gombrich's discussion of Egyptian's treating the Pharaoh's size as representing status while the Greeks read the painting as the actual story of a hero, larger than life (cf. pp. 135–36). For Gombrich's dislike of expression theories and of abstract art, see in *Meditations*, pp. 56–69, 143–150.
9. Maurice Denis, "Definition of Neo—Traditionism," in Chipp, ed., p. 99.



10. Graff, *Literature Against Itself* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), especially chapters 1, 2, 6, 8. I analyze specific problems in his arguments—for example what can be said to represent what in a story—in my *Act and Quality* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), a work which also provides a general account of the *rhetorical* or “*dramatistic*” perspective I develop here and which clarifies how I use Goodman on exemplification. I should also note an increasingly popular contemporary perspective on representation as resemblance which seems to combine expressivist and descriptive categories in a way absolutely opposed to my own. From Bakhtin on the one hand, Paul de Man on the other, we find emerging a realism based on negative rather than positive categories: a “true” representation is one that shows the failure of all our interpretive categories and leaves a residue we take as full or recognizable human reality. For this applied to the drama see Howard Felperin, *Shakespearean Representation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), and for an idealized application that makes the novel a privileged form (and reveals Felperin’s bias) see Michael Holquist and Walter Reed, “Six Theses on the Novel—and Some Metaphors,” *NLH* 3 (1980), 413-24. These seem to me profoundly Pyrrhic arguments, like New Critical versions of the non—discursive, because they give literature a content which transcends and cancels any predications the medium might allow us to make about non—textual experience.

11. Derrida, *La Verite en Peinture* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), p. 10.

12. My use of ideas like “standing for” and acting for are strongly influenced by Hannah Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California, 1967).

13. For my purposes it does not matter whether we ground the art function or purpose in illocutionary conventions, aesthetic attitudes, art worlds, or authorial intentions. And I claim adequacy only within traditions that grant some distinctive attitude to how we examine an aesthetic object as a significant particular. These are compatible with a wide variety of theories on how we use what is so constituted.

14. For an analytical account of art works as not bound by Kripke’s causal view of names and hence as providing a range of imaginative identities, see Mary Bittner Wiseman, “Identifying Subjects,” forthcoming in *American Philosophical Review*. And for a radical literary account of Romanticism as the projection of possibilities rather than description, see Donald Pease, “Blake, Crane, Whitman and Modernism: A Poetics of Pure Possibility” *PMLA*, 96 (1981), 64-85.

15. Wallace Stevens, *The Necessary Angel* (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 123-24.

16. My alternative is a pluralism of means that I do not think necessarily entails an individual supporting a pluralism of ends. See on this subject my essay “Taking Ends Seriously: Criteria for Discussing the Purposes of Literary Criticism.”

17. This, I realize now, is what Wittgenstein means by displaying one’s critical grasp of a work by performing it or

showing someone how to go on with it. See his *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, ed. Cyril Barrett (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966). And for an attempt to generalize this criteria of going on, which I now see (from Henry Staten) misses the radical nature of Wittgenstein's questions but works for practical cases, see my "Going on and Going Nowhere: Wittgenstein and the Question of Criteria in Literary Criticism," in William Cain, ed., *Literature and Philosophy*.

18. For a good summary of the arguments against using ideas of mental representation in epistemology, see Richard

Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), chapters 1-3.

19. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations*, p. 34.

20. Stanley Cavell, *The Claims of Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, Parts 1 and 4).

21. W. J. T. Mitchell makes a similar point about the change in the status of image, from being largely verbal to being largely pictorial, once empiricism takes hold. His essay "What is an Image" overlaps with mine, I think, in several supportive ways.

Professor of English  
University of Washington  
Seattle, Washington 98195  
U. S. A.

## ART AND GOODNESS :

### COLLINGWOOD'S AESTHETICS AND MOORE'S ETHICS COMPARED

T. J. D I F F E Y

R. G. Collingwood's theory of art, which is elaborated in *The Principles of Art*<sup>1</sup> (hereafter PA), rests on the principle which G. E. Moore also exploits when he sets out his account of goodness in the opening chapters of *Principia Ethica*<sup>2</sup> (hereafter PE). The shared principle is Bishop Butler's dictum, 'Everything is what it is, and not another thing'. It is well known that Moore applies this 'law of identity' to the analysis of goodness where he seems to think that it has particular application; with what results is a matter of some controversy. It has not been noticed, however, that with the implicit aid of the same principle Collingwood produces an account (with substantial implications) of art. Before making good the claim that there is this comparison to be drawn I shall broach the broader question of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics by making a more general comparison between the two books.

#### I

According to Collingwood art is the subject-matter of aesthetics (PA vi) while ethics, as Moore understands it, is 'to cover .... the general enquiry into what is good' (PE 2). What views do Moore and Collingwood respectively take of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics ?

First Moore: Moore bases ethics on aesthetic enjoyments in the sense that aesthetic enjoyments or appreciations ( he uses these words interchangeably )

constitute one of the chief goods in life only for the sake of which are duty and virtue ultimately justified (PE 188—9). It is gratifying to find aesthetic appreciation taken so seriously by Moore but unlikely that this extraordinary claim gets the connection between moral and aesthetic values right.

One might suppose that if aesthetic appreciation has a foundational role in ethics the study of it should be subsumed under ethics. This would be a mistaken inference, however. Aesthetics, Moore sees, is a distinct branch of philosophical inquiry, the task of which is 'a classification and comparative valuation of all the different forms of beauty' (PE 200).

By aesthetic enjoyments Moore means the enjoyment of beautiful objects, among which he distinguishes three sorts of case: beautiful works of art, beautiful natural objects and what is beautiful in human affections.

Collingwood rejects this view of aesthetics. Aesthetics is the theory of art, not beauty; for the theory of beauty belongs not to aesthetics but to 'the theory of love'. To regard beauty as the object of aesthetic inquiry will result in 'an attempt to construct an aesthetic on a "realistic" basis'. This, Collingwood says, is the attempt 'to explain away the aesthetic activity by appeal to a supposed quality of the things with which, in that experience, we are in contact; this supposed quality, invented to explain the activity, being in fact nothing but the activity itself, falsely located not in the agent but in his external world' (PA 41).

*Principia Ethica* is an excellent example of what Collingwood is attacking here: realist assumptions at work in the philosophy of beauty. Moore, more typically of aesthetics than Collingwood, which is not to say correctly, places the spectator not the artist at the centre of aesthetic theory.

To compare Moore's ethics and Collingwood's aesthetics is to bring into view the fact that we do not have only two concepts, art and goodness, to consider, but three: art, goodness and beauty. If aesthetics is to be more than the piecemeal analysis of standard topics it will have to explain how they are all connected.

## II

According to Collingwood, 'The words "beauty", "beautiful", as actually used, have no aesthetic implication. We speak of a beautiful painting or statue, but this only means an admirable or excellent one' (PA 38). And later: 'The word "beauty" .... connotes that in things by virtue of which we love them, admire them, or desire them' (PA 40). According to Moore, .... the beautiful should be *defined* as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself, (PE 201).

Strictly speaking, these accounts should not be compared since Collingwood claims to be reporting how the word 'beauty' (and its equivalents) are used in 'the common speech of European civilization' whereas Moore is interested in the real definition of beauty. A comparison between the two accounts is nevertheless instructive.

(i) Moore confines beauty to admiration, which looms large in Collingwood's view too, but Collingwood is less restrictive than Moore. In his definition of beauty Collingwood also includes that in virtue of which we love or desire things. (The inclusion, in Collingwood's account, of desire is interesting, given the dominant Kantian insistence in our aesthetics on distinguishing beauty and desire; but not much can be made of this since Collingwood also denies the Kantian assumption that beauty belongs to the subject—matter of aesthetics.)

(ii) Good is more important in Moore's account of beauty than in Collingwood's. Collingwood accepts a connection between beauty and goodness in so far as he thinks that to say that something is beautiful is to recognize its excellence, but he is no farther interested in what good is involved in beauty. Moore, by contrast, is exercised by the nature of the connection, which is widely recognized to exist, between goodness and beauty, and endeavours to explain it.

For Collingwood, beauty presumably means certain sorts of excellence, or excellence that is valued in certain sorts of ways, so that there may be kinds of goodness or excellence that are not beautiful, namely anything which is excellent but not admired, loved or desired. How plausible this is depends on whether it is taken exclusively or inclusively, disjunctively or conjunctively. There are excellent things which we do not admire, excellent things which we do not love and excellent things which we do not desire, but is there anything excellent which is not the object of these, not loved and not admired and not desired ?

Conversely we may think against Collingwood that there is excellence which we admire but which we do not describe as beautiful, academic excellence for example.

Moore rightly thinks that it is 'a strange coincidence, that there should be two *different* objective predicates of value, "good" and "beautiful" which are nevertheless so related to one another that whatever is beautiful is also good' (PE 201). He thinks that his definition of beauty can account for the connection. It makes 'good' the only unanalysable predicate. Then ... to say that a thing is beautiful is to say, not indeed that it is *itself* good, but that it is a necessary element in something which is' (PE 202). The 'something' Moore means is a complex organic unity which includes seeing not merely the beautiful qualities, say, in a picture, but feeling and appreciating the beauty of what is seen,

and also the true belief that the beautiful qualities cognized in the object are beautiful. Errors of judgement arise when objects which are not beautiful are judged to be beautiful; errors of taste when feelings appropriate to beautiful objects are felt for what is not beautiful.

(iii) Moore takes for granted what from the outset Collingwood denies, namely that the enjoyment of beautiful objects is aesthetic enjoyment. According to Collingwood the aesthetic implication conveyed by the phrase 'a beautiful statue' is not conveyed by the word 'beautiful' but by the word 'statue' (PA 38-9). By 'aesthetic activity' Collingwood means creating and responding to works of art, whereas by 'aesthetic enjoyment' Moore means enjoyment of the beautiful in art, nature and personal affections.

### III

Someone says: 'Ruskin writes good prose'. What if anything do I *believe* when I accept it on somebody's authority that Ruskin's prose is good? The answer to be had from the earlier chapters of *Principia Ethica* is that to call something good is to ascribe to it ownership of some peculiar part, property or quality. (Moore's critics have rightly noticed that parts, properties and qualities are by no means equivalent, but I do not go into that complication in this article.) Moore says, time and time again, though not always in the same words, that 'good' denotes a simple, indefinable, non-natural quality. However, when he comes in the later part of his book to write about the ideal he seems to set aside this account of goodness and to write about intrinsic wholes as if he had never written in atomistic terms about the peculiar property of goodness. Moore I think simply tires of his atomistic account of good as his book unfolds and tacitly drops it in favour of his notion of organic wholes.

One tradition in moral philosophy since Moore, anti-cognitivism, has drawn approvingly on Moore's critique of ethical naturalism while explicitly rejecting the idea that 'good' is a property-denoting term in favour of the view that its function in moral judgements is to galvanize or guide persons to whom the judgement is addressed to action. These remarks are a bad oversimplification but must suffice here. Their relevance to the present inquiry is twofold: First, the cognitivist versus anti-cognitivist dispute in ethics has implications for aesthetics too; secondly, whereas Moore is a cognitivist in value theory there is some evidence that Collingwood is not.

Suppose we are told: 'Ruskin writes beautifully.' If you don't read him you don't know what a fine writer you are missing.' Or someone says, 'You should see Vienna. It is a beautiful city.' A question for aesthetics is this:

should we follow the cognitivist in maintaining that 'beautiful' describes the character of Ruskin's prose or of the Hapsburg's city ? Or should we follow the anti-cognitivist in regarding such terms as 'beautiful' as devices for reinforcing the injunctions, Read Ruskin ! Visit Vienna ! ?

An anti-cognitivist account of aesthetic judgements must presumably treat them as exhortations to attend to the subject of the judgement. Anti-cognitivists will argue against the cognitivism to which Moore seems to be committed, by maintaining that to judge something is beautiful is to urge that it has a claim to attention without including the further thought that there is some one distinctive feature or property in virtue of which the thing deserves attention; in virtue of which beautiful things are beautiful, and which, if X possesses it entails that X is beautiful.

Cognitivism in the case of Moore takes both a metaphysical and an epistemological form: there is metaphysical commitment to the idea that 'good' denotes a non-natural property and epistemological commitment to the idea that value judgements are truth-assertions. If a particular aesthetic judgement gives rise to a dispute the cognitivist will say that what is in dispute is its truth. For example, it may have been doubtfully asked, *Is* Ruskin a good writer (I thought he was a manufacturer of purple prose,' someone might add). 'Is Vienna a beautiful city (isn't it really somewhat heartless) ?' Such disputes will not worry the cognitivist who can say that what is in dispute here is the truth of particular judgements; therefore what cannot be in general doubt is the possibility of aesthetic judgements as such being true. To doubt then that Vienna is a beautiful city is not, as an anti-cognitivist account of aesthetic judgements must seem to imply, to refuse to visit the place.

#### IV

The old question, whether God approves of good things because, antecedent to his approval, they are good, or whether things that are good are good only by virtue of the fact that God approves of them, has its parallel in aesthetics: does our admiration of X constitute its beauty or is it that, antecedent to the act of admiring it, X is beautiful.

Moore's aesthetics follows the second alternative whereas in Collingwood's aesthetic theory the question cannot arise since, as we have seen, Collingwood excludes from aesthetics the topic of beauty. For him the aesthetic question would not be whether something is beautiful but whether it is a good work of art. Collingwood is not especially interested in the meaning of expressions such as 'X is a good Y'. His philosophy of art is more comprehensive than this. But it is not difficult to see what his account of the

expression 'X is a good work of art' must amount to. First, he treats judgements of good and bad art as judgements of success and failure in art. Secondly, what he is interested in, and this it could be argued is in the spirit of Moore's anti-cognitivist, imperativist successors in ethics, are grounds or criteria, in this case the grounds or criteria of success and failure in art, what it is that makes for artistic success and failure. On the general issue of the meaning of value predicates Collingwood I think is more on the side of the anti-cognitivists such as Stevenson and Hare than of the cognitivists such as Moore. 'There is no sense', he says, 'in using terms like good and bad except of persons or things, that come into practical relations with one's will.'<sup>3</sup> We ought not, for example, to call the past better than the present or worse 'for we are not called upon to choose it or to reject it, to like it or to dislike it, to approve it or condemn it, but simply to accept it'.<sup>4</sup> This is interestingly in the spirit of the anti-cognitivist followers of Moore; their account of 'good' focuses chiefly on its function guiding choices. There is no suggestion then that Collingwood would side with Moore in thinking of 'good' as a predicate denoting some peculiar property.

However, Moore's aesthetic realism is not to be written off too easily. There is something in the second possibility, mooted at the beginning of this section, that a thing is beautiful antecedent to an act of admiring it. It is counter-intuitive to suppose, moreover, that 'Vienna is beautiful' or 'Ruskin's prose is good' mean something like, or no more than, 'Visit Vienna!' 'Read Ruskin!'. One harbours the suspicion that 'being beautiful' is the *reason* why one should see Vienna or read Ruskin; so the beauty of something cannot therefore consist in or be wholly analysed in terms of the injunction or the resolve to attend to it.<sup>5</sup> Indeed something which Moore says is helpful in explaining why it would be mistaken to identify value predicates with injunctions to attend to what is thereby valued, namely when he points out in his pursuit of idealist errors that 'what is good?' is not identical with the question 'what is preferred?' (PE 132). Moore says, 'The fact that you prefer a thing does not tend to shew that the thing is good; even if it does shew that you think it so.' Nor, more strongly, can Moore think that 'what is good' is to be identified with 'what ought to be preferred' if Moore's talk about a non-natural quality or property is taken seriously. 'For' as has been noticed, that X possesses a certain property is no reason for preferring X. There does not seem to be any intelligible connection between, on the one hand, 'X possesses property Y' and on the other, 'X is preferred (or ought to be preferred)'. Since Collingwood's anti-cognitivist instincts in the matter of value predicates are I think sound, and since in apparent contradiction of this Moore I think is right to distinguish between what is good and what is preferred, it is scarcely surprising that I should find the nature of value predicates in ethics and aesthetics to be



a philosophically unsolved problem. The problem is to explain how 'because it is good', 'because it is beautiful' may function as reasons that do not merely rhetorically reinforce injunctions to attend to the subjects of the judgements the reasons support, while not making the assumption that the terms 'good', 'beautiful' denote properties, whether or not metaphysical.

## V

Having considered how Moore relates aesthetics to ethics we should now inquire what place Collingwood finds in aesthetics for ethics. This will require us to elaborate upon Collingwood's account, already touched on, of what makes for goodness in art. Neither Moore nor Collingwood rigidly separates aesthetics from ethics. Just as there is an aesthetic element in Moore's ethics in that one of the goods on which duty is founded is the enjoyment of beauty, so there is an ethical element in Collingwood's aesthetics to the effect that the goodness of a work of art is ultimately a sort of moral goodness in some broader sense of 'moral' than perhaps we are accustomed to see used in modern academic philosophy. By this I mean that Collingwood's theory of art rests on Spinozistic and Freudian notions of uncorrupt or truthful consciousness. For what modern jargon calls 'psychological diseases'—these include corruption of consciousness—Collingwood uses the old-fashioned term 'moral disease' (PA 95).

The question of good and bad art is according to Collingwood the question whether an artist is pursuing artistic labour successfully or unsuccessfully (PA 281). Since in Collingwood's view what an artist is trying to do is express a given emotion, a 'bad work of art is an activity in which the agent tries to express a given emotion, but fails .... A bad work of art is the unsuccessful attempt to become conscious of a given emotion ...a consciousness which .... fails to grasp its own emotions is a corrupt or untruthful consciousness' (PA 282).

Moore's approach to ethics (and aesthetics) is from the directions of metaphysics and epistemology; Collingwood's approach to aesthetics (and ethics) is from the directions of psychology and the philosophy of mind. Among other merits, Collingwood's position exposes the oversimplification of supposing that a person either is or is not responsible for an action, and the related oversimplification that evils are only of two kinds: those that we do and those that we suffer. The symptoms and consequences of corrupt consciousness 'are not exactly crimes or vices, because their victim does not choose to involve himself in them' (PA 220), but nor are they 'exactly diseases, because they are due not to functional disorder or to the impact of hostile forces upon the sufferer, but to his own self-mismanagement. As compared with disease, they are more like vice; as compared with vice they are more like disease.

The truth is that they are a kind of sheer or undifferentiated evil, evil in itself, as yet undifferentiated into evil suffered or misfortune and evil done or wickedness' (PA 220).

Not surprisingly Collingwood does not say much about ethics in *The Principles of Art* any more than Moore says much about aesthetics in *Principia Ethica* and what Collingwood does say is in danger of being overlooked on account of its debt to Spinoza and so not in the orthodox run of modern moral philosophy. Indeed, given Collingwood's unusually wide-ranging interests and the fertility of his contributions to philosophy the paucity of his contribution to ethics, as ethics is commonly understood, is remarkable. But it is after all easily explained if we recognize that what Collingwood takes so seriously is a problem not often discussed in ethics: the problem of self-management. The 'problem of ethics ..... is the question how man, being ridden by feelings, can so master them that his life, from being a continuous *passio*, an undergoing of things, can become a continuous *actio*, or doing of things' (PA 219). And in words which should be inscribed by law on the title-page of every book in ethics Collingwood says: 'When we really begin to understand the problems of morality ..... we find that ..... they have to do with changes to be produced in ourselves. Thus, the question whether I shall return a book to the man I borrowed it from ..... raises no serious moral problem. Which of the two things I shall in fact do depends on the kind of man I am. But the question whether I shall be an honest man or a dishonest one is question that raises moral problems of the most acute kind' (PA 289). Morality, Collingwood says, is both theoretical and practical: theoretical in so far as it consists in finding out things about ourselves; practical in that it consists in 'putting our thoughts into practice'. It may seem that Collingwood is too conservative a thinker here, that his thought is of the change-the-self-to-fit-the-world-variety and not of the revolutionary or reformist let-us-remake-the-world kind. (If the implication of conservatism in Collingwood's thought were true, which it isn't, it would make an interesting head of comparison with Moore's ethics, the conservative nature of which has been well described by G. Warnock.<sup>6</sup>) But Collingwood, who is good at challenging dichotomies, observes that making changes in one's character changes one's environment too, 'for out of the new character which I shall acquire there will flow actions which will certainly to some extent alter my world' (PA 290).

Truthful consciousness is important not only in relation to the ethical problem of self-management and self-direction but also in relation to the creation of and reception by an audience of works of art. Its importance for aesthetics is the role it plays in helping us to understand art, namely that artistic consciousness is uncorrupt consciousness. An audience, Collingwood

argues, does not have the role of passive spectator of a work of art but that of collaborative agent; it provides through what we would now call feedback (a word not available to Collingwood in 1938) some response to the artist's question, have I expressed my emotions. 'Unless he sees his own proclamation, "This is good", echoed on the faces of his audience—"Yes, that is good"—he wonders whether he was speaking the truth or not. He thought he had enjoyed and recorded a genuine aesthetic experience, but has he? Was he suffering from a corruption of consciousness? Has his audience judged him better than he judged himself?' (PA 314). The book closes with the words: 'Art is the community's medicine for the worst disease of mind, the corruption of consciousness' (PA 336).

The criterion of success in art is the expression of emotion; to the extent that the artist's consciousness is false, corrupt or bowdlerized, expression must misfire. The psychological character of Collingwood's aesthetics is clear then. We should also note that Collingwood goes to some trouble to explain the nature of psychology. In particular he criticizes the attempt to model psychology on (what were assumed to be) the methods of the natural sciences. Thus Moore and Collingwood both prove to be trenchant critics of naturalism though perhaps this point of comparison cannot be much more than a pun: for Moore's target is ethical naturalism, the identification of goodness with something other than itself, say psychological states. Whereas Collingwood's quarrel is with the identification of psychology as a natural science. Moore by contrast writes as if he subscribed in psychology to the sort of thing Collingwood objects to, namely an old-fashioned, mechanistic, positivistic view of psychology. This, however, is scarcely to the point since Moore's concern of course was to make progress in our understanding of ethics not psychology. Nor is it surprising that his psychology is pre-Freudian. Collingwood, on the other hand, when he was working out his aesthetics was in the vanguard of psychological thought, that is, he endorsed certain aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis. The qualification 'certain aspects' has to be made since Freud himself, Collingwood thought, was a prisoner of the untenable view that psychology is a mechanistic natural science. But whereas psychology and ethics are sharply distinguished in Moore's thought, there is not to be found in Collingwood any such sharp separation of psychology from aesthetics (or ethics). Indeed, as should be apparent, quite the reverse is the case.

## VI

Moore's famous open-question argument is founded on the idea that it is always intelligible to ask of any complex proposed to be identical with goodness, is it good, thus showing that the complex asserted to be identical with goodness is

not after all identical with goodness (PE 15-16). Good 'is a simple, indefinable unanalysable object of thought' (PE 21). The property denoted by the term 'good' by reference to which the subjectmatter of Ethics must be defined, is itself simple and indefinable (PE 36). Moore, as is well known, attacks approaches to ethics which consist in substituting for 'good' some property other than good, for example, a property of a natural object such as pleasure (PE 40).

Collingwood uses a similar strategy in his aesthetics when he refuses to allow that art is anything other than itself. This truism underlies his attempt to distinguish 'art proper' from things often but falsely confounded with art such as craft, magic (in his special sense of this term), amusement, puzzle, instruction, propaganda and exhortation. These things wrongfully usurp the name of art (PA-32), just as, according to Moore, many things such as pleasure are put forward falsely in ethics as being identical with goodness. At the heart of Collingwood's aesthetics is the notion that art is not to be identified with things which are often mistaken for it but which in fact are not 'art proper'. At the heart of Moore's ethics is the similar notion that things such as pleasure are mistakenly identified with goodness. And just as Collingwood allows that a work of art can *also* be representational, amusing, etc. but is not a work of art in virtue of any of these *other* things, so Moore too allows that pleasant things, for example, can be good while fiercely denying that goodness and pleasure are identical. A thing is not good in virtue of its being pleasant, any more than a work of art is a work of art in virtue of its being representational, etc.

Collingwood's root notion that what makes something a work of art is not what makes it craft, magic, amusement, etc., and conversely something that is craft magic or amusement is not in virtue of that fact a work of art. One does not entail the other, although, and this is commonly overlooked, something may be both. Indeed it is generally the case that something is both art and craftsmanship. Moore's view similarly is that things which are good do not owe their goodness to their possessing any other property such as pleasure (PE 38), while at the same time certainly good things may be pleasant. Pleasure is not goodness then but can occur in good things or in complexes that are good. Whenever we are inclined to confuse art with something else, such as representation, which is not art but which can occur in art, we run up against Collingwood's principle: 'A representation may be a work of art; but what makes it a representation is one thing, what makes it a work of art is another' (PA 43).

Moore says the naturalistic fallacy 'consists in identifying the simple notion which we mean by "good" with some other notion' (PE 58) the naturalistic fallacy is 'the failure to distinguish clearly that unique and indefinable quality which we mean by good' (PE 59). But 'good is good and nothing else whatever' (PE 144). If we substitute 'art' for 'good' here we transform Moore's account in ethics of

goodness into Collingwood's account in aesthetics of art. Both philosophers rely on the principle: 'X is X and not Y' and 'What makes X X is not what makes X Y'. To get Moore's central tenet in ethics 'good' may be substituted for 'X' and 'pleasure' for 'Y' and to get Collingwood's central tenet in aesthetics, 'art' may be substituted for 'X' and, e.g., 'entertainment', 'amusement' or 'representation' for 'Y'. There is then the same refusal on the part of Collingwood to allow art to be anything other than itself as there is by Moore to allow that goodness is anything other than goodness.

The difference is that while Collingwood does find *something* to be identical with 'art proper', namely the expressions of emotion, Moore does not find anything unless it is a non-natural property, to be identical with goodness. Moore's ethics is somewhat less illuminating therefore than Collingwood's aesthetics. Moore holds that that 'which is meant by "good" is in fact, except its converse "bad", the *only* simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics' (PE 5). He says, 'My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for' (PE 6). Moore's answer to the question 'what is good?' is 'that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How is good to be defined?" my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it' (PE 6).

Collingwood's theory of art runs parallel to this account of good, but only so far. For the parallel to be complete, Collingwood, having distinguished 'art proper' from things wrongly confused with it, could not have gone on to give an account of art in terms of the expression of emotion. He would have had to have rested his case on some such statement as 'that' art is art and that is the end of the matter'. That Collingwood does not halt in his account of art here in the peremptory manner of Moore's on goodness is not unconnected with the fact that Collingwood, perhaps going back to Locke's distinction between the civil and philosophical uses of words, has a more satisfactory account than Moore of the role of definition in philosophy. Moore is interested in 'Definitions of the kind . . . which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word' and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean' (PE 7). Collingwood too is interested in the real nature of art though his philosophy is of course more historically aware than Moore's ('I do not think of aesthetic theory as an attempt to investigate and expound eternal verities concerning the nature of an eternal object called Art') (PA vi). But the major difference is that whereas Moore is wholly uninterested in the verbal meaning of 'good', Collingwood believes that philosophical definition can only begin after the verbal uses of the term in question have been surveyed and appraised (PA 1-2). Moore, however, rejects verbal usage as devoid of philosophical interest ('Such a definition can never be of ultimate importance

in any study except lexicography..... my business is not with its proper usage, as established by custom' (PE 6); whereas Collingwood believes that where words such as 'art' are in common use, the philosophical task is 'to clarify and systematize ideas we already possess; consequently there is no point in using words according to a private rule of our own, we must use them in a way which fits on to common usage' (PA 1).

There is in Collingwood's view therefore no point in the philosopher proceeding until he has got questions of usage *sorted out*, not, as in Moore's case, *rejected*. 'Secondly, we must proceed to a definition of the term "art". This comes second, and not first, because no one can even try to define a term until he has settled in his own mind a definite usage of it: no one can define a term in common use until he has satisfied himself that his personal usage of it harmonizes with the common usage' (PA 2).

Moore's view is that real definitions 'are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms. They are simply something which you think of or perceive.....' (PE 7). Real definition of good is not possible therefore because good, unlike horse, is not a complex notion: 'My point is that "good" is a simple notion, just as "yellow" is a simple notion' (PE 7). So far as the meaning of 'good' is concerned then, Moore offers three possibilities and himself chooses the first: (i) 'Good' denotes something simple and indefinable; (ii) it is a complex, a given whole; (iii) it means nothing to all (PE 15). This then is the theory of meaning that Moore brings to bear on his account of good. It is not the theory of meaning Collingwood brings to the theory of art. If we had to describe Collingwood's enterprise in Moore's terms (which there is no reason to do—Collingwood somewhere warns philosophers against allowing their positions to be expressed in the language of their opponents, for that is to lose the argument) we might say that Collingwood writes as if art were complex, not simple. But the complexity of the idea of art is owing to its being relational, not to its being an aggregate of simple qualities or properties, for art is not, or does not denote, a simple property or quality, and definition of a complex does not consist, contrary to what Moore asserts, in the *enumeration* of, or *reduction* to, the simple *properties* or *qualities* that constitute the complex, (When Moore switches his attention from definition to value and develops his notion of an organic whole he drops his atomistic assumptions concerning properties or qualities for something more sensitive to the holistic organicism of idealism: 'the value of such a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its

parts' (italics removed) (PE 27)). In place of a Moorean view of definition as the enumeration of properties then Collingwood holds to the importance for philosophical understanding of stressing relations.

'Definition necessarily means defining one thing in terms of something else' (PA 2). Moore of course does not dispute this but draws the opposite conclusion. There is nothing else in terms of which good can be defined because it is a simple notion. Good therefore is indefinable. We might imagine Collingwood's retort to this as being something like: whatever the case may be with good (and there is no reason to suppose that he would accept Moore's account of this, and some, as I have argued, to suppose that he must reject it), in the case of art, since art is definable then art is not a simple notion.

We may conclude, what in any case has long since been established by Moore's critics in ethics, that the distinction between simple and complex objects of thought has no privileged alignment with the 'law of identity'. For trivially, anything is what it is, whatever it is, whether simple or complex. So in Moore's ethics, good is good and is a simple notion not to be confused with anything else; in Collingwood's aesthetics, art is art and is not to be confused with anything else, say amusement, but art is not in Moore's sense a simple notion.

There is a more important point. Although I have shown that Collingwood is as eager to distinguish good from things mistakenly confused with it, Collingwood clearly grasps that we have to be able to see one thing in terms of another to understand it at all. But this 'seeing' is understanding relations, not spotting properties. Moore thinks that goodness is a property and that understanding it consists in identifying it with some other property, which he rightly sees is impossible. But he draws the wrong conclusion. He concludes that goodness is indefinable, whereas what is mistaken is his property-theory of understanding. Collingwood gets away from this not by looking for the identification of art with something else (though he finds that in the fact that art is expressive) but by looking for what is relational between art and other things. In order, Collingwood says, 'to define any given thing, one must have in one's head not only a clear idea of the thing to be defined, but an equally clear idea of all the other things by reference to which one defines it. People often go wrong over this. They think that in order to construct a definition or (what is the same thing) a "theory" of something, it is enough to have a clear idea of that one thing. That is absurd. Having a clear idea of thing enables them to recognize it when they see it, just as having a clear idea of a certain house enables them to recognize it when they are there; but defining the thing is like explaining where the house is or pointing out its position on the map; you must know its relations to other things as well, and

If your ideas of these other things are vague, your definition will be worthless' (PA2) . Moore's account of good in the earlier parts of *Principia Ethica* is a fine example of recognizing the house without explaining where it is, coupled indeed with blindness to the fact that the question of position could ever arise; for to have a clear idea of goodness in Moore's sense is to deny that there could be other things by reference to which it is to be defined. That would be to introduce an impurity in to the account of goodness but without it there can be no account.

## VII

This is not altogether risible. At any rate it is not bad as an unintended description of the situation modern art finds itself in. For if Collingwood's views on definition are philosophically superior to Moore's, culturally Moore's account of goodness unintentionally anticipates certain striking developments in twentieth-century art. Moore's account is not a bad model for depicting the avant-garde in art whereas Collingwood's theory of art is commonly regarded as romantic and therefore out of date. To suggest that Moore's account of goodness may offer some sort of characterization of modernism is perhaps a new way of stating the old and familiar truth that Moore belongs to Bloomsbury. In aesthetics this means formalism.

It is beyond the scope of this article to develop in any detail the suggestion that Moore's account of goodness serves as an account of the way many artists and their apologists have treated the idea of art in this century. The basic idea is that modernist artists have proceeded as if art were a simple notion, and of many of their works it is a somewhat mysterious fact about them that they are works of art, mysterious because nothing can be said about the sense in which they are works of art. They just are. As Moore seems to have stripped goodness down to itself, thereby making it unintelligible, for the result is that nothing is left, artists likewise seem to have been occupied in expelling from their works the representational, the illusionistic, the expressive, or indeed any other feature or property that might be seized upon by the contemplative spectator and predicated of the work. Instead, we seem to be presented, say in minimal Art but not only here, with works whose only interest seems to lie in the fact that they are works of art. They challenge us to see them as art while at the same time we cannot appeal to any hitherto established sense of art since all traditional expectations of art are ruled out. The concept of art no less than the work that confronts us seems emptied of sense or content. To expect of a work of art



that it should be beautiful, expressive, representational, or any of the things in the past valued would be the aesthetic equivalent of committing the naturalistic fallacy. Art is art and not another thing. Of Minimal Art Edward Lucie-Smith says, 'It consists either of a single unitary object or of series of identical unitary objects'.<sup>8</sup> How is this different from Moore's account of goodness? We have to accept that good things are good because they possess a property of goodness we cannot explain. A Minimal work similarly confronts us obtrusively with question 'am I art?', for there is no other interest to which it can appeal; where there is nothing to delight the heart, mind or senses there is no other question it can raise. In these works there is nothing to attend to but the bare fact, as it were, that they are art, if they are. But to the question so posed, is this art, there seems to be no satisfactory answer. Minimal art thus leads us into an aesthetic deadend as non-natural properties lead to an ethical deadend. Contemporary moral philosophy, in the development of which Moore was so influential, displays the desire, Bernard Williams has observed, 'to reduce revealed moral commitment to a minimum'.<sup>9</sup> I would say of many contemporary works of art that there is a similar desire to reduce aesthetic commitment to a minimum.

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Reader in Philosophy,  
 Editor, *The British Journal of Aesthetics*,  
 University of Sussex,  
 Falmer, Brighton, U.K.

## ON PLAY AND AESTHETIC THEORY

T. R. MARTLAND

Although both ancient Greek and ancient Indian philosophical speculations insisted upon an underlying unity in the universe, it is frequently noted that by and large Indian speculation was concerned with the loss of that unity, and consequently focused upon ways to bring it back, whereas by and large Greek speculations took the loss more as a matter of fact, and consequently focused upon the results of the loss, upon the divisions of the unity, i.e., upon empirical studies.

The observation seems to be accurate. So far as India is concerned it is especially evident in the *Upanisads*, but if we press a little it is also evident in a different way in the *Rig Veda* where caste divisions first appear.

When they divided Purusha, how many portions did they make ?

What do they call his mouth, his arms ? What do they call his thighs and feet ?

The Brahman was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rajanya made.

His thighs became the Vaisya, from his feet the Sudra was produced.

(X. 90. 11-12)

Later, in the *Brahmanas*, the divisions appear in their more developed form and we even find talk of this now divided unity to be the ideal social community, an organic socio-religious structure functioning through the co-operation of all its divisions: the Brahmins as the head of the body, the Kshatriyas as the arms, the Vaisyas as the trunk, and the Sudras as the feet.

But notice, and this is my point, the priest is assigned the place of the mouth or head. As such, it is true, he represents society and we might say a kind of acceptance of the loss of unity, but as priest he also embodies the force for expressing dissatisfaction with the loss. Remember, it is he who is obligated to push into Nirvana.

Aristotle provides our classic example so far as Greece is concerned. It is he who is most responsible for the ensuing Western emphasis upon empirical studies. Living things in this world fascinated him. Not only do we have his *History of Animals*, the longest of all his writings, even after omitting the tenth book which may not be his, and incidentally in which he speaks of elephants and of Indians (Bk. IX, Ch. 1, 610a), but we have *On the Parts of Animals*, *On the Generation of Animals*, *On the Progenerations of Animals* and perhaps *On the Motion of Animals*. And to this list we should add *On the Soul* which Aristotle quickly tells us "contributes greatly to the advance of truth in general, and above all, to our understanding of nature, for the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life" (Bk. 1, 405a5).

And he is a witness to Western empiricism on a more profound level. His interest in the products stemming from the loss of universal unity is in harmony with his rejection of the Platonic emphasis on an ideal world existing apart from the phenomenal world which men experience everyday. He rejected the Platonic tendency toward an abstract *ousia*, that is, a tendency to separate that which is common to individuals from particular phenomenologically experienced individuals, and in its place he affirmed what I have elsewhere called a concrete *ousia*, an essence in which what is common to individuals exists in the individual species themselves.

This allowed him to effect a methodology using metaphors, and further, allow these metaphors and similes to develop into allegories. Thus with some philosophical justification he could look to the creatures of the world, and mingle observations about small birds crowding about the owl with folk stories about the enmity between the eagle and the serpent and the friendship between the fox and raven. He could focus upon what is unique about the things of this world and at the same time point to what they have in common, insisting they share a unity, for those who have eyes to see.

"In the great majority of animals there are traces of psychical qualities and attitudes, which qualities are more markedly differentiated in the case of human beings. For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness and fierceness, mildness or confidence, high spirits or low cunning, and, with regard to intelligence, something akin to sagacity." (*Historia Animalium*, 488a)

As a result we find talk of the salacious partridge, the chaste crow, the intelligent and timid stag and hare, the mean and treacherous snake, the noble and courageous lion, the crafty and mischievous fox, the cautious and watchful goose, the jealous and self conceited peacock, and finally of man, who alone is capable of deliberation. (*Historia Animalium*, 488b)

I hope this does not suggest that Aristotle leaves behind his interest in empirical observations. It is only to point out that though he does focus upon the empirical world, upon the results of the loss of the underlying unity of nature, his methodological assumptions also allow him to generalise from these empirical observations. It is as if from the point of view of external presentation or empirical observation he thought the creatures of his world express their unique individuality and are important in themselves, and from the point of view of internal analysis he thought they express universal truths, a knowledge which transcends empirical observation.

## II

Now I would like to suggest that this trip back to universal truths, harbingers of the underlying unity which so interested Indian philosophers, is interesting to readers of the *Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics* because its applied method, with all of its dangers, is the means by which the West moved forward to a theory of art very much in keeping with what I see to be the full implications of Nataraja, of playful (*lila*) creativity. But I must add, these are implications which Indian speculation, because of its continued focus upon a primordial unity, hesitated, and I dare say still hesitates, to defend.

In order to explicate this suggestion I will trace a pathway to that theory of art from Aristotle's empirical observations of the honey bee. Aristotle is rather accurate in what he says about bees. Although he continues to speak of "kings", all the while suspecting they may in fact be "'mothers', from an idea that they bear or generate the bees," (*Historia Animalium*, 553a), to his credit he hesitates to compromise his observations by forcing on them a too easy parallel of the bee society with human society or in fact even to make moral analogies.<sup>1</sup> But this reserve quickly dissipates with later writers. For example, consider Virgil's impressions in the *Georgics*, written around 34 B.C.E.

I shall portray for you a marvelous scene;  
A perfect, model state;....

... ..

Under majestic laws. This species, solely,  
 Has a homeland, is sure of its household gods.  
 They work in summer, planning for the cold,  
 And store their gatherings in a common place.  
 Some organize for food and consent  
 Are put to work in fields: inside the fort,  
 Still others lay foundations for the combs,  
 Formed of narcissus-tear and resin glue,  
 And hang on these the walls of clinging wax;  
 Others rear the young, their nation's hope;  
 And others press the pure transparent honey,

.....

Some by lot are posted at the gates,

.....

Or shoulder loads brought in, or close their ranks  
 Against the drones, to keep those idlers off,

....

And though their narrow life is quickly spanned  
 (They never last beyond the seventh year),  
 The race lives on, the household's fortune stands  
 Through many years and many generations.  
 They serve their king more slavishly than Persians,  
 Than Parthia's people, Lydia's or Egypt's;

(Bk. IV, 3-518)

A little more than hundred years later Pliny carries on in a like manner, 'What men, I protest, can we rank in rationality with these insects, which unquestionably excel mankind in this, that they recognize only the common interest?'<sup>2</sup> As did Aristotle, he too notes that the "kings" may in truth be concerned with procreation, but his proclivity for making parallels with human society allows him only to think of them as possibly husbands and fathers, never as mothers. An example of his style is as follows:

The commons surround him (the king) with marvellous obedience. When he goes in procession, the whole swarm accompanies him and is massed around him to encircle and protect him, not allowing him to be seen. During the rest of the time, while the people are engaged in labour, he himself goes the circuit of the works inside, with the appearance of urging them on, while he alone is free of duty. He is surrounded by certain retainers and lictors as the constant guardians of his authority<sup>3</sup>....

Later Christian observers follow this line of discourse and are no less inclined to generalize. Basil of Cappadocia in approximately 370 C.E. is quick to assert "the cock is proud; the peacock is vain...; doves fowls ate amorous.... The Partridge is deceitful and jealous, lending perfidious help to the huntsmen to seize their prey."<sup>4</sup> As for bees:

Listen, Christians .... take the bee for your model .... The bok of Proverbs has given the bee the most honourable and the best praise by calling her wise and industrious. How much activity she exerts in gathering this precious nourishment, by which both kings and men of low degree are brought to health ! How great is the art and cunning she displays in the construction of the store houses which are destined to receive the honey !<sup>5</sup>

What he says about the "kings" is no less forceful and moralistic.

It is not election that gives him this authority; ignorance on the part of the people often puts the worst man in power; it is not fate; the blind decisions of fate often give authority to the most unworthy. It is not heredity that places him on the throne; it is only too common to see flattery, living in ignorance of all virtue. It is nature which makes the king of bees, for nature gives him superior size, beauty, and sweetness of character.<sup>6</sup>

Seventeen years later, Ambrose, Bishop of Millan continue in the same vein. "Do you hear what Prophet says ? He enjoins on you to follow the example of that tiny bee and to imitate her work .... The bee, though weak in body, manifests her strength in the vigor of her wisdom and in her high regard for virtuous deeds,"<sup>7</sup> As for their "kings", he very much follows Basil.

There are notable and natural characteristics in the king as he appears among the bees. He must be, for example, outstanding in size and beauty. Besides that, he must possess what is conspicuous trait in a king -- gentleness in character.<sup>8</sup>

And he seems to be aware of Virgil as well. For example he too reports that supposedly the bee custom of self sacrifice far not obeying the laws of "king" "is observed today by the Persians. They inflict death on themselves in punishment for a transgression. But people—neither the Persians whose subjects live under the severest laws nor the Indians or Sarmatians—hold their kings in such high esteem as do the bees."<sup>9</sup>

### III

It should be obvious that Aristotle's interest in directly observing the living things in this world has ceased to be of interest to these later commentators. What now dominates in explication is what the world's creatures are alleged to have in common. Gleaned from texts further removed from direct observation, the parallels they draw are always presented to extract a lesson. For example, following a suggestion from Virgil and Pliny, Ambrose declares

The act of generation is common to all. Their bodies are uncontaminated in the common act of parturition, since they have no part in conjugal embraces. They do not unnerve their bodies in love nor are they torn by the travail of childbirth. A mighty swarm of young suddenly appears. They gather their offspring in their mouths from the surface of leaves and from sweet herbs.<sup>10</sup>

As might be expected this theme proves to be useful for preaching celibacy and for the next thousand years we find references to the industrious and obedient virgin bee as model for monks.

And so it goes on through these centuries, with little variety. Consider the following passage from the 13th century text *De proprietatibus rerum*:

Bees make among them a king. .... and though they be put and set under a king, yet they are free and their king that they make, by kind love, and defend him with full great defence, and hold it honour and worship to perish and be split for their king .... And bees choose to their king him that is most worthy and noble in highness and fairness, and most clear in mildness, for that is the chief virtue in a king.<sup>11</sup>

and these lines from Shakespeare's *The Life of Henry the Fifth*

Therefore doth heaven divide  
The state of man in divers functions,  
To which is fixed as an aim or butt  
Obedience. For so work the honeybees,  
Creatures that by a rule in nature teach  
The act of order to a peopled kingdom.  
They have a king, and officers of sorts,  
Where some like magistrate correct at home,  
Others like merchants venter trade abroad,  
Others like soldiers armed in their stings  
Make boot upon the summer's velvet buds,  
Which pillage they with merry march bring home

To the tent royal of their emperor;  
Who, busied in his majesty, surveys  
The singing masons building roofs of gold,  
The civil citizens kneading up the honey,  
The poor mechanic porters crowding in  
Their heavy burthens at his narrow gate,  
The sad-ey'd justice with his surly hum,  
Delivering o'er to executors pale  
The lazy yawning drone.

(1: 5, 134-204)

But at last a major change does occur. It will put us in grasp of our suggested thesis. In the fourteenth century Petrarch, the first great representative of Renaissance humanism, attempted once again to rectify the Aristotelian balance between the almost lost empirical observation of unique individual things in this world and the dominant tendency up until now allegorize and find in these things of the world only universal truths which transcend in value whatever might be found by empirical observation. He did it on two levels, the practical and the theoretical. Practically he did it with his famous ascent of Mont Ventoux, of which he writes, "I was moved by no other purpose than a desire to see what the great height was like." Interestingly, he also tells of "an old shepherd, who tried to discourage us from the ascent with much talk".

He said that fifty years before, with an ardent youthful purpose like ours, he had climbed to the very summit and that he had got nothing from it but toil and repentance and torn clothes and scratches from the rocks and briars. Never, he said, had he heard that anyone else either before or after had ventured to do the same.<sup>12</sup>

As I say, Petrarch was no less eager to rectify the balance between empirical observations and speculative generalizations in theory. For example in a letter to Boccaccio, dated 28 October, 1366, he draws the analogy with a writer who should

take care that what he writes resemble the original without reproducing it. The resemblance should not be that of a portrait to the sitter—in that case the closer the likeness is the better—but it should be the resemblance of a son to his father. Therein is often a great divergence in particular features, but there is a certain suggestion, what our painters call an 'air', most noticeable in the face and eyes, which makes the resemblance. As soon as we see the son, he recalls the father to us, although if we should measure every feature we should find them all different.<sup>13</sup>



He thus concludes, "we writers must look to it that with a basis of similarity there should be many dissimilarities". Herein lies the change. That to which we shall henceforth look, he tells us, is not to the dissimilarities in order to lose them to a theory of similarities, but to recognize that out of a basis of similarity there is glory in the dissimilarities. And lo and behold, he garners support for his about-face by creatively changing the direction of the centuries-old allegory of the honey bee. "We should write as the bees make sweetness, not storing up the flowers but turning them into honey, thus making one thing of many various ones, but different and better."

This become the new analogy for the future. Approximately two hundred and fifty years latter Francis Bacon, the father of modern science, spells it out.

Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments, and lays it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore, from closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped.

(*The New Organon*, Aphorism XCVI, Bk. I)

We are put in mind of Nietzsche's three metamorphoses; the camel, the lion and the child, who like Zarathustra, in innocence says yes to the not yet.<sup>14</sup> No longer does the West think of emulating the bee as if it were the ant, or talk of emulating spider in order to achieve similarities, in effect to weave webs of analogies out of its own mind sets. Since Petrarch the lesson learned by watching the bee is not one of hard work and obedience to the already known, but rather a lesson of creative and forceful innocence which makes things "altered and digested", different and better". In terms of an analogy once used by the American poet Robert Frost, the artist is now like the person who goes into the field to pull carrots. Although he is sensitive to the form which each carrot already suggests, he refuses to leave them as they are, and keeps

on pulling them patiently enough until he finds a carrot that suggests something else to him. It is not shaped like other carrots. He takes out

his knife and notches it here and there, until the prolonged roots become legs and the carrot takes on somethings of the semblance of a man.<sup>15</sup>

Here a kind of evolution takes place, not toward a formal explication of latent tendencies but as a succession of steps away from them. The contemporary art historian James Ackerman uses almost these same words. He insists, "evolution in the arts should not be described as a succession of steps toward solution to a given problem, but as a succession of steps away from one or more original statements of a problem", and then adds "what actually motivates the process is a constant incidence of probings into the unknown, not a sequence of steps toward the perfect solution".<sup>16</sup>

#### IV

My suggestion now is that this artistic "probing into the unknown", this "altering and digesting", making things "different and better", constitutes the full impact of playful *lila* creativity, Nataraja, the Lord of dancers, King of Actors. In the West it was Karl Groos who was one of the first to teach us to see that "artistic enjoyment", which he also insisted was something which widens and deepens human perception and emotion, was related to the "highest and most valuable form of adult play",<sup>17</sup> and since Piaget there has been general recognition that although in play there is an "accommodation of activity to objects" (a kind of imitation) present, what actually dominates play is a move in the other direction' a creativity or what Piaget calls "an assimilating activity", which incorporates the external objects to *its* schemes.<sup>18</sup> Thus, though in play the ego takes charge, it lets go of what is, altering and making everything different, including itself. This is why children play more easily than adults, they can more easily let go of themselves and of their old world.<sup>19</sup>

When this playful assimilating, creating activity is recognized or interpreted as the dominance or the enjoyment of the playful assimilating activity itself, its affinity with Indian theory is marked. We are often told the Lord Isvara's creative activity is a kind of sport or play done for its own sake, perhaps because of the simple enjoyment he derives from exercising his body, which ofcourse is only to say because 'he wants to', which is no acceptable 'reason' at all. In fact, in the *Bhagavatgita* we are told that we all must so act, because we must, without motive or ends to be attained, simply for the sport of it. But alas, and here is my caveat, it seems to me that Indian aesthetic speculation hesitates to hold onto play's and art's creativity, the assimilation of the world to their schemes. It hesitates to affirm play's and art's creative

fragmentation of the primordial unity. In Indian literature one seems to find always an appreciation of the arts "exhibiting *inner* relations of things" (italics mine), the calling for the arts being appreciated because it expresses not simply emotions, but emotions of a special kind, i.e., *deeply* felt emotions. I mean to say the eye or the mind is, as a consequence, always directed to something else other than the art work itself. If we think of William Gass's example of the striding statue which points, it seems Indian aesthetic theory all too often directs the eye to move beyond the finger's end whereas the sculptured figure really bids us stay and to journey slowly back along the tension of its arm.<sup>20</sup> For example I am thinking of when Shiva expounds the technique of drama to Bharata. Shiva quickly tells him that human arts must be subject to law and that herein lies its validity. In effect he is telling Bharata and all of us to put our outer expressions in harmony with our inner primordial unity. It seems he is telling us that his destruction of the past is effective for man in one direction only, to release him from individuality, to lead him to an inner wisdom deeper and older than any grasped through his individuality.

But from what we know of Shiva this is not at all the meaning of Shiva's playful dance as Shiva understands it *for himself*. And at this point Western speculation lends him its support. For Shiva himself and for the West, the playful dance spins out its force in the other direction by affecting an innocent playful probing into something different and some say, better, toward the destruction of primordial structures and laws and toward the creation of a new world.

## Notes and References

1. His generally accurate and unvarnished accounts are continued in *Historia Animalium*, IX, Ch. 40, 625a.
2. Pliny's *Natural History*, Book XI, IV, 12.
3. *Ibid.*, Book XI, XVII, 53.
4. Basil, *The Hexameron*, Homily VIII,
5. *Ibid.*, Homily VIII, Chapter 4.  
Chapter 3.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Ambrose, *Six Days of Creation*, Eighth Homily, Chapter 21, Section 70.
8. *Ibid.*, Chapter 21, Section 68.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, Chapter 21, Section 67.
11. Bartholomaeus Anglicus, *Medieval Lore*, ed. Robert Steele (London, 1907) p. 122.

12. *Letters From Petrarch*, To Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro, 26 April 1336. Book IV, 1, trans. Morris Bishop (Bloomington, Indiana, 1966), p. 46.
13. *Ibid.*, Book XXIII, 19, p. 198.
14. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* First part, Zarathustra's Speeches, on the Three Metamorphoses.
15. Marguerite Wilkinson, *The Way of the Makers* (New York, NY, 1925), p. 207.
16. James S. Ackerman, "Style," *Art and Archaeology*, ed. James S. Ackerman and Rhys Carpenter (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965), pp. 174- 175,
17. Karl Groos, *The Play of Man*, trans. Elizabeth L. Baldwin (New York, 1901), p. 378.
18. Jean Piaget, *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood*, trans. C. Gattegno and F. M. Hodgson (New York, 1962), pp. 84- 87.
19. "Every genius is already a big child since he looks out into something strange and foreign, a drama, and thus with purely objective interest: Accordingly, just like the child, he does not have the dull gravity and earnestness of ordinary men, who, being capable of nothing but subjective interests, always see in things merely motives for their actions". Schopenhauer, *The World As Will and Idea*, Supplements to the Third Book, Chapter XXXI "On Genius", Vol. II.
20. William H. Gass, *Fiction and the Figures of Life* (New York, 1970), p. 49

Professor of Philosophy,  
State University of New York,  
Albany, New York, U.S.A.

## DANTEAN 'FIGURA' IN CAMUS'S "THE PLAGUE"

R. B. PALMER

The main characters of Albert Camus's *The Plague* (1947) each interpret the disease differently. For Cottard, the epidemic represents a release from police suspicion and an opportunity to make money on the black market, Dr. Rieux considers the plague an enemy of life and happiness to be fought with complete dedication. To Jean Tarrou the disease exemplifies the universal forces, both human and natural, that kill unjustly while to the old asthmatic the plague is nothing less than life itself, the mentality of man accepted as the ground of all being. As one might expect of Oran's spiritual leader, Father Paneloux interprets the epidemic morally. Citing the plagues of the Old Testament as parallels, Paneloux maintains that the disease is both a punishment for Oran's spiritual laxity and an instrument of God's loving kindness; it is "a red spear sternly pointing to the narrow path, the one way of salvation."<sup>1</sup> In this way he eschews any natural explanation of its advent, either by the laws of cause and effect or by those of historical analysis. As experience, the epidemic is for him rather a sign or *figura* (to use the term of Biblical exegesis and medieval poetry) that points toward a greater reality and moral truth. Like the other plagues of sacred history, this outbreak has no particular but rather a general significance. Or, to put it another way, the particular significance of the epidemic afflicting Oran lies in the eternal reality it foreshadows and will be subsumed by. Within the novel, ofcourse, Paneloux's view does not prevail. Dr. Rieux (the obvious spokes man of Camus's own position) rejects its acceptance

of the disease as a blessing. When later confronted with the horrible suffering of an innocent child, even Paneloux changes his position and finds a more desperate solace in the credo that God's will passes understanding. If the content of Paneloux's position is easily dismissed, his method of interpretation, which is grounded in the ancient traditions of the Church, is not. For Camus's own attitude toward history, as *The Plague* reveals it, is strikingly similar. By examining that attitude, we can better understand what has puzzled readers of the novel since its appearance: the form and meaning of the allegory it contains.

In "Create Dangerously" (1957) Camus best explains his ambivalence as an artist toward history. He rejects any wholehearted surrender to historical forces. Of course, he recognizes that the twentieth century writer can no longer afford the "irresponsibility" of a formalist retreat from the commercialism and soullessness of the self absorbed society he finds himself in. Like everyone else, the artist also finds himself embarked on "the contemporary slave galley." But the artist does his "compulsory service" ever mindful that, in banding too vigorously to his oar, he might lose both his oar, he might lose both his ability and right to create. For Camus, history is not a delusive abstraction that tears the imagination away from the universe within. As his essays, especially *The Rebel* (1952), prove, he is too political and moral a thinker, too much a concerned journalist to ignore the world without. Speaking as a writer, however, Camus rejects *engagement* as risky.

The danger posed by history is finally aesthetic. Camus proposes that artistic freedom depends on a delicate balancing act. In his dynamic if melodramatic image, the artist must maintain himself on a thin ridge above twin chasms: "frivolity and propaganda," the stylistic equivalences of a misguided retreat from and a self-destructive embrace of history. Camus sees the literature of the last two centuries dominated by these extreme positions, formalism and realism. He declares, however, that the writer who denies completely the world of his experience makes of fiction a solitary and meaningless recreation. But if the writer accepts history as the material *and* end of fiction, he aspires vainly to a power only divine, God (if He exists) is the only true and total realist. Camus likewise rejects socialist realism, which, even though it conceives a practical approach to style, must accept a lie about what is in order to shape what should be. The *engagement* demanded by realism and the contempt of the aestheticist for his milieu both deny the dialectic every writer must endorse. For the writer must believe that the world is simultaneously nothing and everything. He must embrace experience as the bond that ties him to others "(history," as the analysis of revolt in *The Rebel* suggests, is the intellectual

consciousness of that tie). But he must never cease to "revolt against everything fleeting and unfinished in the world."<sup>2</sup>

Camus's scorn for both socialist realism and ivory tower aestheticism, however, has often been underestimated by critics of his fiction. Two mistaken appraisals of Camus emerge. On the one hand, he becomes, like the protagonist of *The Stranger* (1942), a solitary celebrant of the "benign indifference of the universe," a romantic hero whose *anagnorisis* follows his contemptuous rejection of conventional pieties and bourgeois society. On the other hand, Camus becomes a writer whose fiction extends the partisanship of his journalism, a writer who conceives his novels as rhetoric in the service of social reform. These views present us with a Camus capable of only "frivolity" or "propaganda," but not a true artist.

They have spawned, moreover, criticism of Camus's fiction that either overemphasizes its formal and aesthetic qualities or its concern with political and moral issues. Such distortion becomes in the case of *The Plague* most acute, since this novel, more than his other works, takes contemporary history as its subject. Written during the last part of the war and published not long after its end, *The Plague* treats the occupation and subsequent liberation of France. As any reader of the novel is aware, however, to say that the history of France during this period is the "subject" of Camus's novel is to use the word in a much different sense than when, to take a relevant example, we use it to describe the relationship of the Shanghai rebellion to the events narrated and characters created in Andre Malraux's *Man's Fate* (1933). In *The Plague* Dr. Rieux tells of his experiences during an outbreak of bubonic plague in the French North African city of Oran. The event is strictly fictional, and in the novel no reference is made to the fall of France and its consequences. The experience of the beleaguered Oranians instead evokes the experience of the defeated French. The city is closed off from the rest of the world; radio messages daily beam in support for the suffering citizens; food is rationed, while guards with orders to shoot are placed at the city gates, concentration camps are set up to house those in quarantine, and a crematorium devours the bodies of victims, sending a pall of evil smoke throughout the town. Moreover, the plot turns on the organization of "sanitary squads" to resist the plague's inroads, although the disease's ultimate recession does not come as a result of their efforts.

The novel's setting and plot, we might say, are made in these ways an analogy of the events which are its ostensible ultimate subject. Camus, we must remember, took an active role, as editor of the clandestine paper

*Combat*, in the resistance to German occupation. But his experiences, unlike the similar ones of Malraux reflected in *Man's Fate* are displaced in favor of a fable that implies but does not, in any substantial sense, fictionalize them. In *The Rebel* he defines the world of the novel as a setting "where life assumes the aspect of destiny," where our desire for a *mythos* is at last fulfilled. Clearly, then, if the novelist's task is Aristotelian, is only to arrange action according to the form of action, then history should figure in *The Plague* much as it does in *Man's Fate*, as events to be illuminated which will in turn illuminate, as setting for characters who in their completeness and timelessness overcome the human limitations of endless becoming. Perhaps even more disconcerting is Camus's choice of the word *Chronique* to describe the book. For such a term seems to mock the abandonment of the historical setting and also overreach in its claim for attention to a narration which, without its carefully contexted implications, lacks any historical interest. The novel's style thus raises two questions. Why is the history (whose presence in the book so strongly insisted upon by Camus) so displaced that it becomes the "otherness" of allegory? And what are the stylistic and intellectual sources of that allegory?

Puzzled by the complex relationship between history and fable, critics have generally explained the novel as either a political document or "ordinary" fiction. Because they thought of Camus as the journalist not only on the side of the Resistance but of the social revolution which would restore post-war France, some contemporary readers accused him of formulating in the novel a "morality of the Red Cross" which, by equating the specific historical evil of Fascism with the natural evil of disease, sidestepped the ethical complexities posed by the experience of the war.<sup>4</sup> They castigated Camus for an ivory tower retreat from difficult questions such as the use of force when such acts meant certain execution of hostages. More enthusiastic responses to the book, however, have generally come from those who either ignore or quickly pass over its "historical matter."<sup>5</sup> But such criticism robs the novel of its context, reducing it to a morality play that unfolds *in vitro*. Most recent studies of the novel fall in this category. But such analyses leave unanswered the question asked by the novel's first audience, and Camus's own obvious intentions make this a question which needs answering. Why did Camus apparently choose to evade hard truths in *The Plague* when in *The Stranger* he faced squarely the implications of an absurd life?

The answer is that the novel is no evasion of truth, that it is not a discussion, framed in a meaningless subjunctive, of action and inaction



revolt and acquiescence. The allegory displaces history to clarify rather than distort its meaning. Camus argues for this effect with a quotation, ascribed to Daniel Defoe, that prefaces the narrative proper. One kind of imprisonment, Defoe declares, can be represented by another just as reasonable as anything which exists can be represented by something which does not.<sup>6</sup> Camus here lets Defoe state the method he will follow, but not, of course, his reason for choosing it. For such an explanation we must turn first to his notebooks where, planning the novel he is about to write, Camus observes: "I want to express by means of the plague the stifling air from which we all suffered and the atmosphere of threat and exile in which we lived. I want at the same time to extend that interpretation to the notion of existence in general."<sup>7</sup> After the novel's publication Camus reaffirmed this position in responding to criticism, speaking of the resistance fighters who find their fictional places in the novel, he declared that "doubtless they would do it again in the teeth of any terror, whatever its face, and terror has several, which is precisely why I named no single one in order to strike out at all."<sup>8</sup>

In part it is Camus's intention to convey the particular truth of his experience. To present that truth alone, however, is not enough. His experience suggests a general pattern that subsumes it. And because the general pattern has a relevance that, unlike the event that suggests it, is truly timeless, the pattern itself, cast in the form of a fable, becomes the novel's matter. In other words, *The Plague* presents an overwhelming truth that serves as an analogy for the limited truth which guides the artist's imagination. The war made Camus see that exile, suffering, and love are the essentials of the human condition, that resistance is not a conditioned historical response, but a universal and necessary reaction, that that evil is no transitory intrusion into the automatism of ordinary living, but, like the plague microbe which never disappears, is one of the grounds of being, inexorable in the demands it places upon the human spirit.

As a way of understanding evil, then, the plague is the opposite of a symbol. Literary symbols move from concreteness to a meaning otherwise unfindable or communicable; and it is that meaning, as the terms tenor and vehicle suggest, which justifies or necessitates the symbol's use.<sup>9</sup> The plague as an image, however, allows Camus to make reference to an isolated historical event but at the same time establish its connection to an enduring moral condition. Such an image suits his aesthetic well. For the writer must avoid a commitment to history because that is a surrender to his material, to a limited being in time, to partial vision of human life. Formalism is

also unacceptable because it prevents the writer from "intending," from making the moral leap that the transcendence of history permits. Only on the thin ridge between these two extremes can Camus moralize as he does, endorsing the double truth of event and fable. He thus achieves a perfect balance between the formal, synthesizing activity of imagination and a faithfulness to the world of action.

In his discussion of the novel's style, Donald Lazere recognizes this deliberate tension between different spheres of meaning. But in terming that style "naturalistic allegory," he inadvertently indicates the difficulty not only in using the modern critical idiom to describe it, but also in tracing it to its antecedents.<sup>10</sup> Aware of Camus's arguments against realism, Lazere apparently has used the term naturalism to explain the novel's "realistic" treatment of life in Oran. While Dr. Rieux scrupulously attends to the impersonal and close reportage associated with naturalism, the novel hardly presents an evolutionary or environmental model of human action, nor does it deal in any rigorously deterministic perspective on that action. Since naturalism as a mode of apprehending human behavior rejects idealism for positivism, one further wonders how the novel's displacement of history can in any sense be termed naturalistic. In short, "naturalistic allegory" seems a contradiction in terms. In addition, allegory itself is problematic. Although I have used it until this point to describe the novel's reference to history, allegory does not properly describe the relationship between event and fable in *The Plague*. For allegory generally means a narrative constructed upon a systematic and sustained symbolism of character, setting, and action. In particular, we associate allegory with such narratives in which human characters and representational settings "stand for" abstractions of one kind or another. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and the *Romance of the Rose* are allegories of this type. But Camus does not use the plague as such a symbol. Moreover, the novel's narrative does not function as an allegory in the usual sense because fable and event do not work together as vehicle and tenor.

Lazere's "naturalistic allegory," however, is an interesting attempt both to describe the novel's style and categorize its literary ancestry. For Lazere correctly observes the balance between reference to historical conditions (naturalism) and reference to extrahistorical truths (allegory). One may deride Lazere's terms, but what other modern ones would describe more satisfactorily the novel's style as we have been examining it? This difficulty suggests that we must look elsewhere for possible models and influences.

Because Christian Poetry of the Middle Ages, particularly the *Divine Comedy*, provides us with a very close analogue to Camus's style, I would suggest an influence from that direction, even though this is a proposition

I can in no other way prove. Medieval poets developed a style usually termed figural realism (based ultimately on the fourfold interpretation of Scripture) which uses images to suggest the relationship between different levels of reality. In Biblical exegesis events in the Old Testament were seen as *figurae* or the "forms" of events or characters in the New; likewise those events and characters yielded a moral meaning appropriate to the individual life and an anagogical one which pertained to the state of souls after the Judgement. Such interpretation differs essentially from the allegorizing classical texts had long been submitted to, for Moses, to take an obvious example, becomes a *figura* of Christ's redemption of mankind in his saving of the Israelites, but not a symbol, since his historicity and the meaning of that historicity are each preserved in the relationship between the two events.<sup>11</sup>

Since poetry deals in fictions, what Dante calls "the truth disguised under a beautiful lie," the use of *figurae* there yields a somewhat different result. As Dante suggests, poetry tells the truth by lying. Thus the *Divine Comedy* traces the poet's imaginary journey through the three kingdoms of eternity, but this fiction, as a *figura* interpreted morally, also signifies, as Dante says, "man, in the exercise of his free will, earning or becoming liable to the rewards or punishments of justice."<sup>12</sup> The journey, however, is also a *figura*, of Dante's own spiritual crisis, the mental trek from despair back to reason and grace. And the poem, again as a *figura*, likewise traces the entire history of mankind from sin to salvation, as men learn the gifts of reason and grace and, with God's help, build the just city. In the *figura* itself the various meanings are established by context. Thus Virgil, for example, through the role he performs and the qualities he is made to display, signifies not only the Roman poet who inspired the imitation of Dante's epic, but also the voice of reason, the triumph of the Empire, and the sweet truthfulness of poetry itself.<sup>13</sup>

Elsewhere I have noted that Dante and Camus share a similar humanistic perspective, in particular the simultaneous endorsement of the unity of human experience and its inviolable individuality.<sup>14</sup> In that essay I also suggested that the settings of both novel and poem function as images of ultimate truth. Camus and Dante portray human characters delivered to the ultimate laws that control their destiny, in the *Divine Comedy* the mystery of God's justice and in *The Plague* the inevitability of individual destruction. The imaginative structure of the two works, however, is close in another way. Like Dante, Camus sees individual and collective history as signposts on the road to a greater truth which completes their meaning. Dante's loss of Beatrice and Florence thus "works" much like Camus's enforced exile from his wife and his encounter

with Fascist evil. These personal troubles lead each writer to attempt a *mimesis* of the human experience. The three kingdoms of eternity and plague-ridden Oran can only be understood as images of the earthly city, images whose intent is nothing less than a universalization of human destiny. In *Malraux's Fate*, Malraux creates characters who, in the typicalness of their selves and action are imagined, as the book's title suggests, to point outwards or symbolically toward the eternal laws they exemplify. For Malraux, as for other novelists contemporary with Camus, it is the fact which signifies not the idea signified that demands representation. In *The Plague*, as in Dante, this order is reversed through the use of figural realism, with the result that the reader's imagination is directed down from an all-consuming apocalypse to the particularity of *figurae*, experience of which we share, both individually and collectively, with the artist.

We can, I think, trace the allegory *The Plague* to two sources. First, as we have seen, Camus's attitude toward history derives from a dialectic whose extremes are the total acceptance and rejection of the world as it is constituted. Stylistically, this attitude toward history demands the balancing of the different claims of realism and formalism. *The Rebel* assigns the artist the Aristotelian task of delivering action to its form and thereby "perfecting" it in both senses, but the artist's burden, his obligation to reject, must, as both *The Plague* and *The Fall* (1956) establish, go further in the direction of moral principle in *The Plague*, which depends on the displacement of history, cannot, I think, be explained by Camus's conception of the artist's predicament alone. Camus's use of allegory cannot be traced to any of the novel's obvious sources, nor can it even accurately be described, as Donald Lazere's failure bear witness, in the modern critical idiom. The similarities between Camus's and Dante's conceptions of human history, however, suggest that in medieval poetry Camus discovered a mode of representation that could contain the reach of his moral vision. If the *Divine Comedy*, which Camus certainly knew well and was to use as one of the chief sources of his last novel, is also accepted as a source for *The Plague*, then we can more easily understand the difficulty critics have had with the novel's allegory, for it is an anachronism. Unlike many of *The Plague's* first readers, a medieval audience would have little difficulty in making the connection between the fable and the history figured by it; nor would such an audience permit itself a "formal" interpretation that empties the story of its real relevance to the pageant of human life. The distorting traditions of the realist novel and of formalist literature, however, make correct interpretation difficult, as Camus himself seems to have understood when he felt it necessary to explain his stylistic procedure after being accused of ivory tower moralism. In Dantean figural realism,

however, Camus did discover a style that suited the simultaneous rejection and acceptance of the world. For the image of besieged Oran, like the horror and unspeakable beauty of Dante's eternity, reveals the limitations of our particular vision as it validates its undeniable and irresistible concreteness.

## Notes and References

1. Albert Camus, *The Plague*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Modern Library, 1948), P. 90.
2. Albert Camus, "Create Dangerously," trans. Justsin O' Brien in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) P.564.
3. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), 263.
4. For a full discussion of this controversy see Pol Gaillard, *La Peste: Camus* (Paris: Hatier, 1972), PP.28-31.
5. See for example, Adele King, *Camus* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1964), pp. 64-80.
6. Camus does not indicate the precise source of this quotation.
7. Albert Camus, *Notebooks: 1942-1951*, trans. Justin O Brien (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1936), P. 53.
8. Quoted in Gaillard, *op. cit.*, p. 31 (translation mine).
9. See William York Tindall, *The Literary Symbol* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1355), pp. 3-57.
10. Donald Lazere, *The Unique Creation of Aibert Camus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 173.
11. See Erich Auerbach, "Figura," in *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature* (New York: Meriderian Books 1959), pp. 11-76.
12. Robert S. Haller, ed. and trans., *Literary Criticism of Dante Alighieri* (Lincoln, University of Nabraska Press, 19J3), p. 99.
13. See Auerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
14. The Novel of Revolt, Humanism and Style in *The Plague*," *Renascence* 32 (1980) 67-78.

Professor of Comparative Literature  
Yale University  
New Haven  
Connecticut- 06520  
U.S.A.

## REPRESENTATION AND ABSTRACTION IN PAINTING

RONALD ROBLIN

### INTRODUCTION

The question "what makes a work of art a representation of its subject matter?" has become more relevant since the advent of abstract painting and sculpture in modern art. Contemporary art has distinguished itself in many instances by the creation of new forms and inventions which render problematical the apparently clear distinction between representational and abstract works of art. Is this distinction any longer a useful one? We will discuss this question from the standpoint of aesthetic theory, attempting to resolve it by means of the critical analysis of a number of illustrations of abstract and representational paintings. The problem of finding a criterion by which representation can be marked off from abstraction in the art of painting has been raised by Professor F. David Martin in *Art and the Religious Experience* and more recently in his text, *The Humanities through the Arts*.<sup>1</sup> Martin's approach, which we will adopt here, is to elaborate the basic notions of subject matter, form and content in relationship to works of art and then to apply these categories to the analysis of abstract and representational painting.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the very problems which are encountered in attempting to distinguish between abstract and representational painting extend with equal force to pure and program music, "objective" and "non-objective" sculpture, and classical and modern dance.<sup>3</sup> Our discussion will be confined, however, to this distinction as it arises in our actual experience of a variety of paintings.

The threefold distinction between subject matter, form and content in art constitutes an appropriate starting point for the analysis of both representational and abstract painting. According to Martin, the subject matter of a painting is what it is most fundamentally about - its dominant idea or central theme. Thus Martin identifies the subject matter of Goya's "May 3, 1808" as "man's inhumanity to man."<sup>4</sup> Cezanne's "Mt. Ste. Victorie" is said to have as its subject matter the "mountainousness of mountains" and Siquieros' "Echo of a Scream" the destructiveness of a technological society.<sup>5</sup> These examples suggest that a painting's subject matter is to be characterized in general or abstract terms and not by means of references to the specific individuals or occurrences portrayed in each work. But Martin does not rest with a completely general characterization of subject matter in works of art. He allows for alternative statements of a work's subject matter on varying levels of abstractness. Thus the subject matter of Goya's painting "May 3, 1808" could be identified as man's inhumanity to man, as the horror and destruction of war or simply as the execution of civilians by a military machine. While these interpretations of the painting's subject matter are certainly not incompatible, they are clearly different. The identification of Goya's central subject as an execution, for example, can be subsumed under such broader characterizations of it as the horror of war or the inhumanity of man to man. Each of these interpretations of subject matter is in fact more general than that which precedes it. Martin's criterion for identifying a work's central subject is thus unclear, for he does not specify the level of abstractness upon which we are to search for it. In order to meet this difficulty, we will distinguish between a painting's major or dominant theme, which is always very abstract or general, and its subject matter, which is progressively more determinate and specific. The subject matter of Goya's "May 3, 1808" can be identified as the execution of civilians by a military machine, and the depiction of this event exemplifies the work's main theme (man's inhumanity to man).<sup>6</sup> The notions of subject matter and theme can therefore be distinguished by making clear the level of generality upon which the critic is operating in his discussion of a painting.

The content of an art work, according to Martin, consists in the transformation of its subject matter by means of the realization of artistic form. While subject matter and theme can be abstracted from a painting and considered independently of it, content is held to be *in* the work and thereby inseparable from it. Consequently, Martin directs us to ask not for the content but for the subject matter of a painting when we attempt to interpret it. For example the central theme of numerous paintings is the female nude but each individual

work which exemplifies this subject matter is *qualified* by the artist's distinctive interpretation of it. Rubens' female nude is qualified as Earthmother, Giorgione's as Venus, and Picasso's as the nude imprisoned in her flesh.<sup>7</sup> It might appear then that the introduction of such qualifications in an account of a painting's subject matter enables us to talk directly about its content, but this is not the case. Each qualification we introduce brings us no nearer to a concrete identification of the work's artistic content because it consists in nothing more than a further refinement of our previous characterization. It follows for Martin that the content of a painting cannot be captured in the language of art criticism, for criticism always occurs at a certain level of abstractness and content is irreducibly individual. Criticism, by virtue of its abstractness keeps us at a perpetual distance from the full concreteness of the artwork as it is present to aesthetic perception. The notion of content is therefore crucial to Martin's analysis of the work of art but plays no positive role in the elaboration of his theory of criticism. This is an implication of Martin's position which he seems to ignore, for in a different context he speaks of the job of interpretive criticism as the determination of artistic content.

#### REPRESENTATIONAL PAINTING

Martin utilizes the notion of subject matter as a basis for his initial attempt at defining representation in painting.<sup>8</sup> A representational painting is one which designates specific objects and events as its subject matter. The paintings by Goya, Cezanne and Picasso mentioned earlier are clearly representational, for each includes within its subject matter a reference to definite objects and events. It follows that a painting is abstract if it does *not* contain as part of its subject matter any reference to specifiable objects or events.<sup>9</sup> This seemingly straightforward account of representation in art is modified by Martin when he turns to a number of paintings which he considers only ostensibly representational. Arp's "Mountains, Table, Anchors, Navel" appears to be representational because the objects referred to by its title are easily identifiable in the painting. However, Martin claims that this work can be appreciated more readily as an abstract painting for the following reasons: (1) The painting's form does not clarify or illuminate its ostensible subject matter i.e. we obtain no insight into the nature of mountains, tables, etc. through participation with this work. (2) If this painting is appreciated purely as a study of color, shape and line, it becomes aesthetically rewarding. In fact, Martin proposes that we retitle this work "Colors and Positions".<sup>10</sup> A second example of a painting whose real subject matter is not representational



is Parmigianino's "The Madonna with the Long Neck".<sup>11</sup> Viewed as a representation of the Madonna and child, no insight whatsoever is provided into the work's ostensible theme. Viewed, however, as a study of shape, color and light, Martin claims that this work continually rewards us by the power and appeal of its sensuous forms. Martin's initial criterion for identifying a work as representational has therefore changed in the course of his discussion, for he now relates representation to a work's content as opposed to its subject matter. If a painting can *best* be appreciated through the apprehension of its sensuous and formal values, it is to be classified as abstract regardless of the fact that it contains references to specific objects and events. It follows that Martin has made a work's content, or rather our perception of its content, the appropriate standard for classifying it as representational or abstract. In effect, Martin has not so much abandoned his previous characterization of representation in terms of subject matter; he has rather proposed that the perception of content becomes the very criterion by which a work's subject matter can be determined. So stated, it is insufficient that a painting contain references to specific "objects" for it to be properly classified as representation; these "objects" must be part of its content.<sup>12</sup>

We have seen that Martin holds that a painting, to be representational, must ( 1 ) designate definite "objects" and ( 2 ) clarify a subject matter relating to these "objects" by means of artistic form. In addition, Martin distinguishes between paintings which contain artistic value and those which claim to be art but are not i.e., artistic failures. In other words, he employs the expression "work of art" in a normative fashion: a work of art is by definition a work which is artistically successful. Otherwise, it would manifest no content, for content is the result of a transformation of subject matter through artistic form. A work which merely *illustrates* a subject matter without clarifying or interpreting it does not qualify as a work of art. Consequently, Martin's initial characterization of representation is inadequate for it pertains solely to subject matter without introducing considerations of artistic content. His initial characterization of representation therefore applies not only to works possessing artistic value but to any work which depicts, whether through interpretation or merely as an illustration of its subject, a specific event or state of affairs. By relating the concept of representation to artistic content, Martin has in the process narrowed the class of paintings which are appropriately regarded as representational. Only paintings which possess artistic merit now qualify as representational works of art. However, Martin does not argue for a strictly objectivistic position when the question is raised of the precise means by which a painting's content is to be determined. In his discussion of Ar hile Gorki's

"Waterfall", he claims that our capacity to recognize the bounce and rhythm of the colors of waterfalls in this painting is relative to our past experience, but not to the existence of objective characteristics which are simply "in" the work.<sup>13</sup> Thus, while viewer A is able to discern the expressive power of the color and motion of waterfalls in this work and B is not, it does not follow that they are any shortcomings or inadequacies in B's perception of the painting. For, on this view, each viewer's response now becomes crucial in determining what the content of this work is. Martin thus appears to adopt a subjectivist account of the sense in which content belongs to a painting. Accordingly, he now holds that no single viewing of a painting is decisive for the determination of its content. For numerous paintings, according to Martin, can be viewed no less profitably as abstractions than as representations, in which case the percipient's attention will be directed to the purely sensuous and formal values of a painting. If we adopt this position, it follows that a painting becomes abstract or representational in accordance with what a viewer brings with him to his encounter with the work. A painting is abstract if it can be enjoyed purely as a configuration of lines, colors, shapes and textures. It comes representational when its content is perceived as clarifying a determinate situation or event. Martin's position is here reminiscent of those Wittgensteinian philosophers who analyze visual perception in terms of seeing-as. If we employ the familiar example of the figure which can be perceived either as a duck or as a rabbit but not as both simultaneously, we can understand how a painting can be viewed in either but not both of two ways at the same time. And this point can be generalized to cover a considerable number of works which possess both "plastic" and "dramatic" values. It begins to appear that Martin is in the camp of such formalists as Roger Fry who holds that it is possible to value certain paintings *either* as pure designs *or* as illustrations of a subject matter, but not as both in a single, unitary aesthetic experience.<sup>14</sup> Martin, however, rejects this account of aesthetic experience, for he argues that the formalists' efforts to separate plastic and dramatic values is mistaken, and that "somehow" we participate with a work's dramatic subject matter *through* our grasp of its design.<sup>15</sup> A second difficulty for Martin arises from his unwillingness to relativize aesthetic experience in such a way as to make the content of a work depend upon our individual responses to it. There are appropriate and inappropriate ways of responding to works of art, as Martin shows in his discussions of "The Madonna with the Long Neck" and "Mountains, Table, Anchors, Navel". Each of these paintings is properly viewed as abstract rather than representational, notwithstanding its ostensible subject matter. But to maintain that a painting becomes abstract or representational solely in

relation to its "cash value" in aesthetic perception opens the door to just the sort of subjectivism regarding artistic value and "taste" which Martin rightly criticizes at the outset of *The Humanities Through the Arts*. Formalism, as Martin argues, severs the appreciation of art from the distinctively human values realized in the artist's interpretation of his chosen subject matter and theme.

### ABSTRACT PAINTING<sup>16</sup>

As we have seen, Martin is unwilling to interpret abstract painting as pure design or "significant form" alone. In fact, he singles out the formalists for criticism because they divorce aesthetic experience from the apprehension of significant human values. He claims that even abstract painting interprets a subject matter, which he identifies with the "schema of the sensuous" - the universal features of the visible - as revealed in a painting's lines, shapes and colors. "The primary subject matter of abstract painting is surely the sensuous in all its qualitative infinity abstracted from definite objects and events.<sup>17</sup> But how can the treatment of line, color and shape be relevant to human concerns? For Martin, abstract painting is humanly significant because it reveals the meaning of the most general pervasive qualities of the visual world. His assertion that abstract painting clarifies a universal subject matter - the "schema of the sensuous" brings it closer in its aesthetic function to representational painting than might initially appear: both types of painting seek to reveal elements or aspects of reality. The difference between them is not that abstract, in contrast to representational painting, fails to *designate* an aspect, of reality, but that it thematizes the most abstract and general characteristics of the visual order. Representational paintings, Martin argues, designate specific objects and events while abstract paintings designate the "primary qualities" of visual phenonema. A representational painting can therefore be interpreted as abstract if it is viewed purely as a configuration of lines, colors, shapes, etc. The formalists' error is that they generalize a mode of perception peculiar to abstract painting and treat it as an account of aesthetic perception (simpliciter).

Martin's account of abstract painting is rooted in two key concepts borrowed from Whitehead: *sensa* and presentational immediacy.<sup>18</sup> Martin utilizes the notion of *sensa* or presentational qualities as a means of clarifying the content of abstract painting. What we see and directly experience in our encounter with abstract paintings is a configuration of sensuous qualities. Martin thus rescues the concept of *sensa* from its misuse by "sense-datum theorists" who

were preoccupied by the pseudo-problem of the relationship between sense-data and physical objects in perception. Ignoring this question, Martin employs the notion of *sensa* to characterize the phenomenologically given in our aesthetic experience of abstract painting. What is thus given is not a canvas covered by swirls of paint nor a depiction of any kind, but instead a unified configuration of line, color, shape, etc. The notion of *sensa* thus enables Martin to differentiate the functions of abstract and representational painting, for abstract painting attracts the percipient through its interpretation of line, color and shape alone rather than by representing anything specific. Even a representational painting, may move us aesthetically through the appeal of its sensuous and formal qualities. If the object of aesthetic perception is *sensa* or the sensuous alone, we will value the painting on account of its presentational qualities. If, in addition, the work successfully interprets a representational subject matter, we will further value it on account of its representational content. The difference between presentational and representational qualities can be readily seen in works which possess one short of content to the exclusion of the other. Thus, "The Madonna with the Long Neck" attracts Martin purely as an interpretation of the "schema of the sensuous" and not at all as a representation of its ostensible subject matter. In contrast, another painting may depict the same religious subject matter while failing to reveal the "schema of the sensuous" through its presentational qualities. Furthermore, we may distinguish between the mood created by the work's sensuous and formal values and the mood created by the portrayal of "subjects" in a representational painting. This point can be restated in such a way that we may speak of a work's sensuous-emotional values and not merely of *sensa*. As Collingwood and others have maintained, every *sensum* carries with it an emotional charge.<sup>19</sup> Each configuration of *sensa* creates a mood or emotional "world" which is peculiar to itself; therefore we may hold that the emotional aura or mood of a successful painting is qualitatively unique, and constitutes the basis of the work's aesthetic value. We are not given in aesthetic perception a mere collection of *sensa*, each having a separate emotional charge, but rather a pattern of *sensa* which contains an emotional charge that is not merely the sum of its parts. If this observation is correct, a painting will possess an emotional tone through a combination of its sensuous and its formal qualities and, if the work is also representational, through its depiction of a character, event or state of affairs. Both abstract and representational paintings, then contain an expressiveness native to the presentational and representational qualities which they possess. And it is the "expressed world" of painting which constitutes the source of its aesthetic value.<sup>20</sup> The question of whether the emotional overtones attendant upon presentational and representational

qualities give rise to a unified or "fused" aesthetic experience is not one which we will pursue in detail here. It is, however, implicit in Martin's account of representational and abstract painting.<sup>21</sup>

Martin employs Whitehead's notion of presentational immediacy to characterize the percipient's distinctive mode of perception in this encounter with abstract painting. Presentational immediacy denotes a state of mind in which the beholder is immersed in colors, shapes and textures of the painting before him. In this mode of perception, the viewer's attention is undisturbed by references to objects, events or situations outside the here and now of aesthetic enjoyment. In contrast, the appreciation or representational painting requires that the percipient divert his attention from the presentational qualities before him in order to consider the social and historical significance of the "objects" depicted in the work. He is thereby drawn outside the "magic circle" of the here and now to an awareness of the past and future. However, Martin cannot consistently maintain that our participation with abstract painting involves a state of sheer presentational immediacy, for the claim that abstract paintings designate and clarify the universal qualities of phenomena cannot pass unnoticed in the aesthetic experience. We are thus outside the circle of sheer immediacy to think about a painting's references to the qualities of things. If this is correct, our absorption in the immediacy of the here and now is compromised,<sup>22</sup> although Martin can emphasize the fact that paintings are further insulated by their frames from outside world. As a result, our attentiveness to *sensa* or presentational qualities frees us from engaging in any conceptual mediations during our aesthetic encounter with abstract paintings. To the extent, then, that Martin stresses the element of concreteness in the work of art, he is able to gain support for his phenomenological description of the mode of our participative experience with abstractions as a kind of presentational immediacy. However, when he emphasizes the designative dimension of abstract painting, the direction of interest in aesthetic perception appears to shift from the apprehension of a painting's sensuous content to an awareness of its latent universality. Pure consciousness of *sensa* becomes a form of self-consciousness; a state of immediacy gives rise to mediations leading beyond a concern with the here and now.

## CONCLUSION

1. The concept of representation is applicable to any class of artifacts, including paintings, which depicts specific objects, coarctates, events or states of affairs. The artifact which depicts such objects, etc. may or may not

claim to be fine art. It may pretend to be no more than illustration, on the one hand, or pure decoration, on the other. It may be an artistic failure or a genuine work of art. Consequently, any such artifact is representational in the descriptive sense of this term simply because it is a recognizable depiction.

2. The term 'artistic representation' applies solely to paintings (and other representations) which have "content", i.e. are successful works of art. In this sense the conception of representation is normative or evaluative for the critic. According to Martin, a painting's content is revealed in the clarification of its subject matter by means of artistic form. It is, therefore, essential that the critic be able to distinguish between a work's real as opposed to ostensible subject matter. The artistic value of a representational painting does not arise from the fact that it is a successful depiction, however interesting or valuable its "subject" may be. Artistically, its interest may reside wholly in its revelation of sensuous and formal values. As a purported interpretation of a representational subject matter, the painting may be uninteresting, puerile or inauthentic. Its real - as opposed to ostensible - subject matter will consist of its treatment of line, color, shape, light, texture, etc., which alone will account for its artistic success. In such cases the sensitive beholder will interpret the painting as an "abstraction" and be guided in his appreciation by its sensuous-formal values alone.
3. Abstract painting is properly characterized as painting which interprets such sensuous and formal values as line, color, shape, texture, etc. As Martin shows, the subject matter of abstract painting is "the schema of the sensuous" as this notion applies to the visual world. Moreover, there is a wide range of abstract painting which at one extreme can be illustrated by Mondrian's "Composition in Red, White and Black" and at the other by his "Broadway Boogie Woogie". Mondrian's "Composition" lends itself to nothing more than an appreciation of its sensuous-formal values and the emotions which the contemplation of these values gives rise to, while "Broadway Boogie Woogie" is more complex in the demands it makes upon the viewer, for this painting can be valued both for the power of its sensuous-formal qualities as well as for its interpretation of the subject matter referred to by its title. "Composition" is in fact a paradigm case of an abstract painting, for it attempts to distill the universal significance of the colors, shapes and patterns which it interprets. By contrast "Broadway Boogie Woogie" might be considered a paradigm of a painting in the "mixed mode," for it seeks to clarify representational as well as sensuous-formal values.

4. The test of whether a (successful) painting is abstract or representational or both at once rests, as Martin argues, squarely upon the nature of its content. A painting which attempts and fails to reveal a potentially significant representational subject matter can succeed artistically only as an abstraction. It may also be effective as *illustration*, but this is not an aesthetically valuable characteristic of a depiction. A painting whose sensuous and formal qualities fail to inform us about the "abstract" values of line, color, etc. can succeed only as *decoration*, assuming that no representational values are present in it. But a painting which possesses *both* representational and sensuous-formal content will succeed artistically as a representation *and* abstraction. Whether our response to a painting containing both kinds of artistic value is all of a piece or not can be determined only by the test of aesthetic experience. On the one hand, the proponents of formalism are undoubtedly correct in holding that our experience of many paintings containing both representational and sensuous-formal content does not result in a psychological fusion of "dramatic" and "plastic" values. On the other, those who maintain, with Martin, that we somehow perceive representational content at work in the realization of painting's "plastic" values, at least in certain cases, may be correct. Surely, the sensitive viewer of Cezanne's "Mt. Ste. Victorie" cannot but discover the coalescence of representational and sensuous-formal values in a single, homogeneous aesthetic experience.

## Notes and References

1. *Art and the Religious Experience* (Lewisburg, 1972), *The Humanities Through the Arts* (New York, 1975) with Lee A. Jacobus.
2. *The Humanities Through the Arts*, Chapters 2 - 3. Hereafter cited as *HA*. For a critical discussion of these categories, see the present author's "Martin on the Revelatory Nature of Art", forthcoming in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*.
3. Martin notes the analogy between abstract and representational painting, on the one hand, and pure and program music, on the other, in *Art and the Religious Experience* P. 139. For the sense in which this comparison is warranted, see footnote 21 below.
4. *HA*, PP. 32-3
5. *Ibid.*, P. 6. Elsewhere, however, Martin identifies the subject matter

of "Mt. Ste. Victorie" as the mountain itself and not as the "mountainousness of mountains". Which characterization of this painting's subject matter is to be preferred appears to depend for Martin on the direction of the beholder's interests. If the mountain in its individuality is the real focus of aesthetic interest, the general character of mountains will be of secondary concern. But if an insight into the nature of mountains is the primary goal of aesthetic attention, "Mt. Ste. Victorie", will be regarded merely as an *instance* (perhaps a paradigm case) of this general idea.

6. *Ibid.*, P. 31, 68, 85.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 52. Martin's statement of the various ways in which a particular theme (e.g. the female nude) can be qualified is presumably intended to apply only to representational paintings. No similar treatment of abstract paintings seems possible.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

9. It must be stressed that there is a spectrum of 'values' ranging from paintings which are explicitly representational through borderline cases to those which are undeniably abstract. In the actual world of works of art, there are borderline and exceptional cases of paintings which frustrate every attempt to formulate a universally applicable and unambiguous classificatory scheme of artistic genres. The

distinctions drawn in this paper should not be considered as theoretical absolutes; they are intended to be useful in clarifying the interpretive possibilities implicit in our perception of paintings.

10. *HA*, pp. 111-112.

11. *Ibid.*, PP. 105-107. Martin thinks that a more apt title for this painting would be "Sinuous Spiraling of Sensuous Volumes".

12. *Ibid.*, P. 109. This, notwithstanding the fact that the artist's selection of subject matter (and therefore them) precedes in time its transformation into artistic content. It is the subject matter of a painting which is significant for the historian and the sociologist of art rather than the work's content,

13. In the following examples a painting's title is taken to be a plausible interpretation of its representational subject matter. For more on this subject, see Martin's valuable discussion of the role which titles have in determining our perception of a painting's content in his article "Naming paintings", *The Art Journal* Vol. XXV, No.3 (Spring 1966).

14. See *Transformations* (New York, 1926), Chapter 1.

15. *HA*, P. 31. *Art and the Religious Experience*, P. 148.

16. For a helpful discussion of some of the differences between abstract and "non-objective" painting, see Mieczyslaw Wallis' paper "The Origin and Foundations of Non-Objective pain-



- ting," *JAAC* 19 (Fall 1960), pp. 61-71.
17. *Art and the Religious Experience*, P. 153 ff. See also *HA*, P. 85 ff.
  18. *HA*, pp. 86-92.
  19. R.G. Collingwood, *The principles of Art* (Oxford, 1938), PP. 162-3, 232, 266. Collingwood distinguishes between three different degrees of representation. Representation to the "second degree" presents the viewer with the pattern or *Gestalt* of an 'object' as opposed to depicting it in empirical detail; for example, the abstract pattern of a ceremonial dance articulated in the design of much Celtic pottery. Representation to the "third degree" projects a definite mood through the work's sensuous and formal aspects; in this context Collingwood mentions Brahms' song "Feldsamkeit" which captures perfectly the mood or emotional state of a person lying in the grass and gazing at the procession of clouds directly overhead. We follow Collingwood in characterizing both sorts of works as "representational," although only works which are representational to the "third degree", such as "Waterfall," concern us here.
  20. For the sense in which the "expressed world" of the work of art is the source of its artistic value, see M. Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (Evanston, 1973), PP. 176 f.
  21. Do we *see* the colors of motions of waterfalls in Gorki's "Waterfall", or does the work, aided by its title, merely *evoke* in us the feelings which we recall having in the presence of waterfalls? Probably the latter. The title of this work *directs* us to look for certain qualities in it which we otherwise might have missed. But it would be simplistic to conclude that "Waterfall" contains a literal representation of its subject. Rather, the mood or emotive tone which accompanies our perception of the colors and motions of waterfalls is somehow evoked by the sensuous patterns of this work. Here we may speak of an emotional charge on a specific *Gestalt* or sensuous pattern. For example, Debussy's "La Mer" evokes in us a certain mood which, after acquaintance with its title, we proceed to associate with our experience of the sea. As a result, the tone poem is interpreted as representational art to the "third degree".
  22. According to Martin, "the participator (with an abstract painting) loses his self-consciousness" with the result that "mediation is kept at the outskirts of our attention." See *Art and the Religious Experience*, PP. 148-9.

## RICHARD ATTENBOROUGH'S 'GANDHI': AN ESSAY IN UNDERSTANDING

S. K. SAXENA

Sir Richard Attenborough's film *Gandhi* has elicited various reactions. Some have admired the 'pathos and poignancy of its sensitive portrayal of Gandhi's basic philosophy of life', and its ability to bring out his relevance to our times. Attenborough, they add, 'has made Gandhi dynamic'<sup>1</sup>. Others have complained that some major personalities of the Indian struggle for Independence appear but puny men in the film<sup>2</sup>. Most of the critics however agree that it is a great film. I seek in this essay to merely unfold the fabric of this film as an art-work; and, in passing, to throw some light on such reactions.

I may begin by stating what I regard as necessary equipment for a task of this kind. One needs a fair knowledge of the following: the ancient Indian view of the good life; classical (North) Indian music<sup>3</sup>; the basic faiths of Gandhi; and his social and individual objectives. It would be of help if I quickly explain the last two of these.

There are quite a few faiths that determine Gandhi's life. The most important of these is his faith in God and prayer<sup>4</sup>; and in *ahimsa* as the best way to oppose evil and to realize God or (the ultimate) Truth. But he is also convinced of the superiority of ideals over merely individual life; equality of religions in respect of their life-giving value; and the intrinsic dignity of every human individual and of all (permissible) work. Besides, like all orthodox Hindus he regards vows (or *yanas* or *niyamas*)<sup>5</sup> as essential to goodness of being and behaviour, and accepts the theory of *karma* if only in so

far as it posits an inexorable link between the quality of an act and its consequences. As for the goals he seeks to realize, those that relate to society are: Hindu-Muslim unity; removal of both untouchability and oppression of women; and of course the political independence of India. Gandhi's personal objectives are not all well known. Some of them crystallize in his closing years. He now longs to fill himself evermore with faith; and - as attestation of his faith in both God and *non-violence* - to meet, if necessary, the assassin's bullet with nothing but love in his heart and God's name on his lips<sup>6</sup>.

Almost all these shapers of Gandhi's life are in my view projected in the film<sup>7</sup>, sometimes as mere hints, yet always intelligibly. But the viewer has to know not merely what Gandhi's faiths are, but how he *interprets* them. Consider an instance. In the scene which shows Kasturba in deathbed Gandhi says: 'It is my time for a walk, but I will soon return'. Why is this utterance permitted? After all, Gandhi does not really leave for a walk; and what impresses the average beholder here is his appearing visibly moved, and shedding a tear in spite of his customary poise. What is then, I therefore repeat, the value of the words? Are they only the index of a habit? No; they are not so for those who are aware of the subtler details of Gandhi's thought. To them, the utterance is a sign of his living faith in God; and this because of his following way of thinking:

"He alone can claim to have faith .... who in life ceaselessly endeavours to observe the law of God. For, .... He and His law are one"<sup>9</sup>

God (Himself) is continuously in action<sup>10</sup>. I claim to have faith in God .... (and so) I keep my routine with clock-like regularity.<sup>11</sup>"

At many a place indeed the film articulates by *distilling* what it is about. This is here unavoidable. Where only a small part of historical reality can be incorporated in a work, every detail picked must be somehow made multiple in meaning. Such is, I believe, the moment when (in the film) Gandhi suddenly leaves off serious parley with his colleagues to treat a limping goat with a mud-pack. It signifies on the one hand his faith in nature-cure to which there is no other reference in the film; and, on the other, his well-known view that, in so far as a good way to worship God is to serve His creatures, every act which gives relief to any one of them is of positive value. The second of these may seem odd to many. But it explains an impressive aspect of Gandhi's personality. He could lavish attention on, and imbue with significance what seems trivial to the average man. This must be foreknown to us. Otherwise, the scene where Gandhi initiates Margaret<sup>12</sup> in the art spinning would appear, *because of its manifest leisureliness*,

discordant with the situation; for Gandhi is here confessedly oppressed with the very serious matter of the Muslims' growing fear of Hindu domination after Independence, a factor which Jinnah turned into an argument for partition, and which therefore shattered Gandhi's dream of freedom for an *undivided* India. Attenborough seems anxious to ensure that we mark Gandhi's fairness for all necessary activity; and so during his very last meal before assassination we find Gandhi making two such remarks, both with *visible* relish,<sup>13</sup> as appear disconnected and unequal in value: the one proclaiming his heroic resolve to go to Pakistan to assuage communal passion, and to show that 'Satan resides only in the hearts of men'; and the other drawing notice to the right way of eating a radish. In another context Gandhi declares his intention, with perfect non-chalance, to dwell in the same speech on both the evils of war and the place of goat's milk in human diet. Such a sequence of what appears trite and the clearly momentous is likely to bewilder us unless we remember that, for Gandhi, alertness in respect of every due concern is a mark of the man of faith<sup>14</sup>.

If what the film builds upon is thus an abstraction from a very rich fabric of faith, incident and action<sup>15</sup>, it must surely have been difficult to make the projection seem self-complete. How does the film manage to secure this requisith suggestion? I believe, by the use of a device which is perhaps quite rare in the region of films, but is commonly employed in our classical *sangeet*<sup>16</sup>. Attenborough makes the work emanate from and upgather itself in a focus. This is how I interpret the feature that the film both begins from and ends with the assassination scene. Is such a practice outlandish for art? I must answer in the negative. A clear source of self-completeness in north Indian music is the cyclic quality of its rhythm. The music freely begins from and flows back to the first beat which thereby appears as a focus. And a presentation of the *Bharata Natyam* style of dance commonly begins with the number called *alarippu* which is both begun and rounded by an identical disposition of the two hands (over the hand) known as *anjali hastakam*.<sup>17</sup>

I refuse to accept the suggestion (made by some critics) that the film's *similar* termini signify predestination. I am aware of the view, fairly common in India, that the whole course of a man's life may be regarded as but the unfoldment of a prefixed plan. But this is surely not the net import of the film under review. Its dominant look is one of resolute, ceaseless action<sup>18</sup>. It is not without purpose that the work is made to open and end with the sight of a movement: that of *gathering* for prayer in the one case and of flowers still *afloat* in the other. But in this context I attach greater value to some other

features. The opening assassination scene, for instance, is followed directly - *and with an apt little suddenness* - by a firm, if fleeting projection of many feet marching solidly as one before the whole funeral procession is shown at a distance. I see in this detail the hint of an attitude that distinguished the real Gandhi in crises: resorting to action *with a will* instead of mere sorrowing<sup>19</sup>. Further, in the second close projection of the funeral march, only one or two feeble wails ruffle the ear.

Throughout the film indeed action seems to overrun - and, I may add, to outpassion - spells of quiet thinking, leisurely reminiscence or immediate discomfiture. Thus, as we see him lit up by some happy, unhurrying recollections<sup>20</sup> on the seaside in Porbandar, Gandhi suddenly arises with a *visible* jerk, sets out so nimbly towards his *ashram*<sup>21</sup>, and voices an intent of such resoluteness<sup>22</sup> that the suggestion of leisurely recall is forthwith cancelled. Gandhi's *silences*, be it noted, are no mere pauses between sounds, as in music<sup>23</sup>; they either teem with self-searching, or they release an impulse to heroic action. In the case I just referred to, what issues is the resolve to undertake the famous Dandi March. But, be it noted, even in the interval that here separates resolution from action - I mean where he is shown as resting, with Ba<sup>24</sup> massaging his head - Gandhi does not appear to *be at rest*. He quickly 'appoints' successive commanders of the historic march; speaks with assurance of his ability to walk for full five hundred miles; and voices his faith in the success of the venture by *repeating*: 'Time will tell'.

The resolution is surely not ordinary. A little later I shall try to show that its emergence is not quite explainable in human terms alone. But at the same time, with a view to keeping Gandhi appear human all along, Attenborough is rightly careful to make the seaside reminiscence follow a quite natural linkage of ideas: the sea with its openness - the city itself, quite as open, to men of various faiths who freely inhabit it - the open-minded priest whom Gandhi knew as a child, and who would recite, with equal regard, from scriptures of different religions - and, sea-brine-salt law (to be broken). In fine, a passage of easy recall delivers a grantte resolve.

Turn now to a shot shows Gandhi moveless, listening intently to a harrowing account of the riots searing Calcutta as a result of partition. Here too, as the next step dawns on his inner eye, he suddenly arises - *but sans nimbleness now, because he is ageing*, and appears a little bent as he makes for the door. Intrepid in Calcutta, he begins a heroic fast. The end is Herculean, but is at last realized: the rioting ends<sup>25</sup>.

But, be it marked, the two situations I have cited are also the Index of a feature of Gandhi's faith. To him God is always 'a very present help

in trouble'. This is hinted adroitly in the film, by opposing Gandhi's manner to that of Charlie (Andrews). The latter speaks of God but twice<sup>26</sup> in the whole film; and in either case he appears to think of God as merely transcendent. In the first situation, where they both manage to pass by three threatening lads (on the pavement) unharmed, Charlie thanks his stars, and Gandhi is made to appear a little surprised, saying that he had so far regarded Charlie as a believer (in God as a presence). Gandhi's own emphasis is on God as an indwelling Spirit on which he feels 'stayed'<sup>27</sup>, and which is at once an impulse to moral endeavour and a norm of its excellence. It is faith as continual awareness of God *so regarded* that imbues his silences and even retrospective talk with a power to energize action. The following from his writings may here be cited:

' "Faith is nothing but a living wide-awake consciousness of God within<sup>28</sup>. There is not a moment when I do not feel the presence of a witness whose eye misses nothing and with whom I strive to keep in tune.' "<sup>29</sup>

But even if it be admitted that the film rightly projects Gandhi as (in the man) a man of action, a question remains. How is the assassination scene (as I have said) focal in value? As follows, I may argue:

The kind of death Gandhi actually meets is in truth the attainment of his *personal* destiny. A day before his death, we are told, he (yet again) longs 'to demonstrate by one perfect act the faith that filled him and which he had struggled through his life to express'<sup>30</sup>. His own words here are:

"Note that if someone were to end my life by putting a bullet through me.... and I met his bullet without a groan, and breathed my last taking God's name, then alone would I have made good my claim (to be a man of God)<sup>31</sup>."

The mainspring of Gandhi's dynamic life is his well-known dual faith — in God (or Truth) and *ahimsa* as loving but resolute opposition to evil; and this faith is clearly aglow in the manner of his death. If it is so taken in respect of its significance, the death scene would appear as a focus of the film as well. For what follows the opening scene — say, depiction of Gandhi's struggles in South Africa and of his trials in India, be they in courts of law or in the thick of public life — all teems with a display of the same resoluteness. And this is clearly also the effect of such dramatic situations in the film as the Gandhi March and the Calcutta fast. Indeed, if the opening projection of 'the end' and the film's evolution towards it be taken as one, the whole work would seem the story of a life that is self-fulfilling, *though not self-enclosed*.

I add the qualifier because of what I *see* in the film as it ultimately ends: the flowers that *keep afloat* when events and persons have all disappeared. Gandhi's disembodied words that here meet the ear reinforce the suggestion. The only utterance that occurs twice in the film<sup>32</sup>, they deepen the visual meaning, they firmly, if softly, declare that Truth and justice outlive tyranny. At this point, however, one may sense a discordance. Does not Gandhi himself disappear from the scene? How exactly then does truth abide? The answer may be had, I suggest, by recalling a detail of the opening: I mean, what the three commentators say about Gandhi as the funeral procession moves on. 'Here was a man who, without any specialized training in art or science, put tyranny to rout by force of mere humility and truth'. On the other hand, the finale and the way it is attained conjoin to bear out the opening tributes. If therefore the film's termini are taken along with the content they bracket, of effort and attainment, Gandhi would appear to pass away not without leaving a rack behind, but as blazing a trail of glory. In attaining to its close the film not only appears self-completing, but releases value for contemplation; and the viewer is not merely deeply moved, but feels edified.

Another question may now be taken up. How is the film made to seem undivided on the inside? I can here point to many details. There is first (I repeat) a single thread running through the whole film: the attitude of resolute but non-violent opposition to evil. Further, if a dialogue makes a point or projects a principle, accordant action also follows. The film is replete with instances of such balance. But here of course Attenborough is helped by the subject's own quality. Parity of practice and principle was a key feature of Gandhi's life. Besides, use is made at times of contrast and similarity so that sequences bring about a mutual heightening of effect. Thus, when the scene opens up for Gandhi's entry into the state of Porbandar after he has shown (as a votary of Truth) singular *steadfastness* in a legal trial, what meets the viewer's eye is not only the landscape, but a *boulder*<sup>33</sup> so jutting and close to vision that one does not miss it. Again, where the Dandi March is shown, Gandhi's frequent — and, at places, a little protrusive — *nama'skaras* (salutations with conjoint palms) along with his nimble pressing forward on the one hand, and the concave convergence of two rows of marchers from opposite sides on the other, unite to project the powerful sight of a popular, though peaceful uprising for a common goal.

As an instance of the use of contrast, I attach very great value to Attenborough's placement of the scene where General O'Dyer is tried for the Jallianwalah Bagh massacre. The bloodshed and the trial are in one way alike:

I mean their *calculated* quality which many little details, of words<sup>34</sup> and behaviour, clearly project. But, the *poise and the slow*, incisive accents in which the jury phrases its questions heighten by contrast the *tumult* of the preceding scene — the wanton killing; and the *threadbare* quality of judicial enquiry puts in relief the *intense* pensiveness, the blow-up of a mood, which follows in the figure of Gandhi, as it fills a very large part of the screen, and which the *Sarangi* music — a passage in *raga gurjari tidi* — makes beautifully manifest<sup>35</sup>.

Take, again, the two visuals that bring out the immediate joy *and agony* of the way Independence dawns (as attenuated). In callous disregard of Gandhi's clear stand, partition is accepted; and the rival camps cheer as the flags are unfurled, of a newly born Pakistan and a sovereign India. As the cheering dies down we see an adroit use of the film-maker's distinctive ability to make an object *appear completing itself before the eye*. A pole erect but bare, unlike the flagstuffs of the two new nations, slowly ekes itself towards the ground, revealing Gandhi in poor light literally<sup>36</sup>, and as poring over the *charkha* (or the spinning wheel) which now hums to him, we may say, 'the still sad music of humanity'. There is no sound here, of music or spoken word. Yet the pathos is writ large, though it is made to issue very gently by means of the touching suggestion that the daughter by commitment — Mira Behn, here with her back towards Gandhi — cannot bear to look at her crestfallen Bapu<sup>37</sup>! It is a consummate speaking through silence; and in my view the most moving scene. But its impact, I repeat, will be feeble on one who is not aware of Gandhi's following confession:

"My life's seems to be over ... I hope God will spare me further humiliation.... Today I find myself all alone.... (The others all believe) that peace is sure to return if partition is agreed upon.... But I can clearly see that the future of independence gained at this price is going to be dark."<sup>38</sup>

And if it is taken by itself — or as wholly apart from its context in the film and real life — the scene in question would seem what it literally is: quite without colour.

On the other hand, there are quite a few shots which, in respect of their ability to move us<sup>39</sup>, are relatively independent of their context. Such a one, for instance, is the Ba death scene. And when I say so I have in mind not the detail which bespeaks Attenborough's amazing eye for truth — that is, the *one* whole tear that comes to nestle in Gandhi's eye — but the quiet build-up of heartfelt pain as it wells up to, and for a moment dishevels and overruns a visage that is generally serene.

In most other cases, however, we must consider the context to see what a projected incident means. Or the detail may seem merely amusing, if not



quite unnecessary. I have here in mind Charlie's ascent to the roof of the moving train. His being pulled out in two opposite ways — by men sitting atop who are quick to befriend him, and by Kasturba (in the train) who does not want him to incur the risk — seems a little overdrawn and at best amusing. But the moment we take into account all that goes along with it the doubt disappears. It is now seen as an index, on the one hand, of Kasturba's motherly concern for Charlie, and, on the other, of the fact that the average Indian of those days certainly did not hate Englishmen as such. The latter suggestion is itself needful to see the true character of what follows<sup>40</sup>: the sight of many corpses of Indians (on the railway track) killed as a reprisal for the derailment of an arms train by revolutionaries. The overall meaning is that unprovoked violence is not (yet) the creed of the average Indian. Above all, if taken with Gandhi's remark that there is anyway no room in the compartment, and also with the sight of many travelling on the top, the visual reinforces what the prior cloth-wafting scene<sup>41</sup> expresses so poignantly: the idea that Gandhi's self-identification with the masses in their plight has begun.

A yet more embracing look is required to see how the characters *grow* in the film. From a hubby who has to coerce his own wife into discipline Gandhi soon matures into a father-figure for many, for the inmates of his *ashram* in particular, so that even the daughter by commitment (Mira Behn) quietly obeys his forthright orders<sup>42</sup>; and lastly, he mellows (in his fasts) into a symbol of self-effacing love. Correspondingly, he rises also in the eyes of his opponents. During his first imprisonment an officer calls for Gandhi 'the goat'; later, he is 'Gandhi, Sir' for those who come to arrest him; again, when he is tried for inciting people to rise against authority once the whole court, following the chief judge, arises in respect as he enters; and ultimately, by virtue of his surpassing goodness culminating in martyrdom, he wins the superlative eulogy of Einstein.

I wonder if the other arts permit such an easy-to-follow *growth* of character, as against consistency of its portrayal. Attenborough makes the most of this power of his medium. It is *not* true of the way Patel is projected in the film. But Ba' to be sure, matures noticeably; and Nehru's meteoric moods could not have occurred earlier than where they do in the film. And if the work's focus is professedly on Gandhi, is it fair to expect that just because his colleagues seem great *to us* they should so appear also in relation *to him*?

## Notes and References

1. 'Arun Gandhi on Attenborough's *Gandhi*' in *Imprint* (Bombay), December' 82, 7.
2. Abu Abraham in his essay: 'Unsupporting Cast' in *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) of Feb. 20, '83.
3. The music is by Pandit Ravi Shankar; and one feels impelled to refer to the very effective employment of what seemed to be snatches of *ragas* (melody-types) like *jog*, *gurjari* *todi* and *tilak kamod*.
4. Though mammoth gatherings at Gandhi's prayers are nowhere shown, there are at least three references in the film to prayer and his faith in it: his 'invitation' to pray for all those who are killed for (and in) derailing an arms train; his utterance, during the fast unto death, that he will regard his prayer as answered only when rioting totally ends; and the assassination scene which (twice) shows Gandhi breathing his last with the name of the Lord (Rama) upon his lips.
5. The five *yamas* are: truth, non-violence, non-stealing, non-acquisitiveness and celibacy; and *niyamas* are: purity, contentment, self-study, fortitude and surrender to God.
6. Pyarelal: *The Last Phase*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1958. p. 766.
7. Gandhi's penchant for vows is manifest where he rehearses his marriage with Kasturba; and the value of ideals as against merely individual life is openly affirmed by Gandhi during his Calcutta fast.
8. The *singleness* of the tear is here an index of Attenborough's consummate concern for truth. I can clearly recall that when Kasturba actually died the caption of the news item (with a Photo) in a leading daily was: "Even the great shed a tear".
9. *The Last Phase*, 242.
10. *In Search of the Supreme*, By M.K. Gandhi, Compiled and edited by V.B. Kher, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1961, Vol.11, 127.
11. *The Last Phase*, 242-43.
12. Margaret Bourke-White of *Life* magazine. Here, I may add, Attenborough also projects Gandhi's emphasis on constructive programme and village handicrafts.
13. Visible, yet unequal.
14. Thus see: "The mark of a man of faith is that, he is always awake and alert in every little thing." *The Last Phase*, 242.
15. This the film clearly is, on the maker's own admission. It opens with a screen projection of the notice that it is but a modest attempt to gain some insight into Gandhi's mind and soul, and into 'the essence of his Life-current'. So it is unfair to criticize the work because of its

inadequacy to the wholeness of what it is about.

16. *Sangeet* is the Indian word for vocal-instrumental music and dance.
17. *Bharata Natyam* is the well-known classical dance of South India. For knowledge of the detail I here speak of I am indebted to Smt. Tara Balagopal, researching with me.
18. Which is only proper, for Gandhi's philosophy 'was essentially a philosophy in action'. Pyarelal: *The Last Phase*, Preface, V.
19. Thus, even when, quite against his explicit wishes, partition of the country was about to be accepted. Gandhi "was not the one to waste a single word in futile sorrow. Resident, wondrously more now than ever, he began teaching the people to start thinking in terms of their future and particularly their own immediate duty." *The Last Phase*, 215
20. Gandhi is here talking to Hugh Walker. Such talk by Gandhi, we may note, does nothing to bedim his awareness of God as the indwelling spirit (*antaryamin*).
21. An *ashram* is a place of rest cum moral and spiritual training, *The Last Phase*, 215.
22. The utterance here is: "I shall first go to the *ashram* and then give a proof of the fact that the British government is not going to last."
23. It is true that the pauses here make for the build-up of effect, and enable the listener to, so to say, get into the music; but they are not in themselves the locus of any activity.
24. Or Kasturba, Gandhi's wife.
25. When this happens, and before Gandhi ends the (successful) fast, a serene sunrise is made to herald the ultimate victory of peaceful endeavour. I owe this notice to Mr. Shailendra Singh, the well-known playback singer.
26. In the one case Charlie's remark is: 'Why should I disturb the peace of the One up there for my sake'; and in the other, where Kasturba wonders what he has in mind as he struggles to climb to the top of the train, he says: 'I am going closer to God'.
27. *In Search of the Supreme*, Vol.1., 213
28. *The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi*, compiled and edited by R.K. Prabhu and U.R. Rao. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1967, 63.
29. *Prayer*, Edited and compiled by C. Kaji Navajivan, 1977. 35.
30. *The Last Phase*, 765-66.
31. *Ibid*, 766.
32. Once during the fast unto death; and next towards the end, as accompaniment to the carriage of ashes.
33. Towards the left upper corner of the screen.
34. In the massacre scene, I recall, O'Dyer expressly commands: 'Shoot accurately'; and the shooters themselves lose no time in directing fire suitably when some men seek to escape by climbing the wall on the

- onlooker's left.
35. Another effective employment of *sarangi* music occurs where mass migration is seen to follow the country's partition. *Sarangi* is a musical instrument which Indians regard as eminently capable of reproducing the subtleties of classical vocal music.
  36. I wonder if the same purpose, of heightening Gandhi's isolation, is served if we couple in imagination the only two scenes projecting a downpour: the one following Gandhi's release without bail in Champaran where a huge crowd ovates him; and the other appearing after the abortive Round Table Conference appears quite lone with but two escorts all huddled under an umbrella.
  37. 'Bapu' is a simple Hindi word of reverence for 'father'.
  38. *The Last Phase*, 210-11.
  39. If not in that of being quite intelligible.
  40. Though not immediately, a brief glimpse of Jinnah-Nehru-Patel preceding the gory sight I here speak of.
  41. The reference is to Gandhi's letting his shawl float towards a lady who is very poorly dressed. This is the only occasion in the entire film where Gandhi helps someone with a *thing*. Henceforward, because he reduces his own possessions to a minimum, he can serve others only by *self-giving*, or by trying to get their grievances redressed with utmost devotion.
  42. I have here in mind Gandhi's following order to Mira Behn, when she wishes to participate in a movement: 'You first spin: let others join the *morcha*'.

Professor of Philosophy of  
Religion and Arts,  
Delhi University (South Campus),  
Delhi, India.

## BAUDELAIRE'S EXPERIMENTS WITH TIME

N. M. R A O

What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow  
Out of this stony rubbish ? Son of man,  
You cannot say, or guess, for you know only  
A heap of broken images ....

T.S.Eliot, *The Waste Land*

Readers have come to associate Baudelaire with black beauty, hashish; and sordid images of corruption, decay and evil. But these images were only refuges for a tormented man. Torn between an idealism that made him profoundly religious and a sensualism that was intensely candid, Baudelaire was in no fit condition to meet the challenges of life. An unhappy childhood and a step-father had added much of bitterness to his life. Hungering for love and understanding, he learnt to respond with a stubborn resistance to his step-father's military discipline. Foiled in his attempts to bring the young man under control, this step-father, Colonel Aupick, decided to send him away to India. Baudelaire made the journey upto Mauritius, which was then a French colony, and would go no further. He drank in all the exotic beauty of the island, which came to symbolize for him the sensuousness of the East. Then he returned to his homeland to declare that he was of age and to claim his patrimony. But he quickly squandered away the property that he inherited, and came face to face with life in the raw which the Bohemian Quartier Latin offers. But this also made him think that he was free to experiment with life and to dedicate himself to art.

Baudelaire was the first European poet to show an intense awareness of, and concern with, the condition of modern man. He conceived of modern man as surrounded by a heap of broken beliefs, the debris of shattered systems. Amidst that rubble he found and reared those *fleurs du mal* which have not faded for us even to-day. The *fleurs* are the symbols of the desire to experiment in life and in writing, and of the desire. They are rooted in a profound *ennui*, which Baudelaire seeks to escape. In his attempts to diagnose his own suffering, he tried to gain a better understanding of its causes. He felt that the chief cause of his suffering was the contradictory pull of past and future which prevented him from exploiting or enjoying his life (= the present). He is particularly obsessed by the past, which brings with it the remembrance of sins committed, and contaminates the present. Instead of helping man in his dealings with life, the past is an evil which stifles him, and like *un nuage affreux*, cuts him off from the real Modern man, whom the poet exemplifies, thus isolated from the flow of life, becomes a stranger to the world in which he lives, an alien incapable of action. In that condition all effort becomes futile, and man is no better than a lifeless object lost in the desert of silent, unfamiliar things. It is this experience that Baudelaire expresses imagistically in a poem like "La Cloche Fêlée". The suffering and stifling of the self under a weight of remorse is the condition of *ennui*, which in a more virulent form becomes *spleen*. There are several poems which express this mood of spleen. Spleen, which according to the poet, is the very essence of evil is presented in lurid colours, and is represented as the typical malady of modern life. The connection of spleen with the past leads Baudelaire to meditate on the nature of time.

What is the nature of time ? That is a question more likely to interest a philosopher or a scientist than a poet. Yet Baudelaire was almost obsessed with the problem of time. He considered time was at the root of all the happenings in man's life. When Baudelaire contemplated the emptiness in his own and in modern man's life, he felt this emptiness could be traced to a sense of frustration, of being trapped in time. He sees a continual threat in the clock,

Horloge ! dieu sinistre, effrayant, impossible,  
Dont le doigt nous menace et nous dit: 'Souviens-toi.'<sup>1</sup>

In poem after poem, Baudelaire speaks of the destructive power of time; "Le Temps mange la vie ...." It is time which has condemned man to falsehood, error and *ennui*. In viewing time as a part of reality, Baudelaire seems to anticipate the modern scientists' concept of time as the fourth dimension of reality. But, Baudelaire asks, could man never get free from the bondage to time ? In despair, the poet defies

.... l'ennemi vigilante et funeste,  
Le temps!<sup>2</sup>

In his prose-poem, "La chambre double", Baudelaire imagines what would happen if one could get away from this dimension of time. He gives us two views of a single situation, an ordinary living room with and without the time element. First, we have the room in its time-less aspect. Everything appears strange, the curtains and the furniture different from anything we know of in daily life:

Les meubles ont des formes allongées, prostrées, alonguies. Les meubles ont l'air de rever; on les dirait douées d'une vie somnambulique....

Ici tout a la suffisante clarté et la délicieuse obscurité de l'harmonie.<sup>3</sup> This dream-like qualities, the beauty and clarity, are the result of the absence of but one element to which we are accustomed, namely time. The magic and solitude of this state of freedom from time gives place to another. The magic is shattered by a knock at the door, which brings in the detested bailiff. With his entry the world of familiarity returns. This change is also brought home to the poet by the ticking of the clock:

Oui ! le temps règne: il a repris sa brutelle dictature.

The awareness of time brings with it memory, and memory brings in the past.

The poem suggests the distinction of two kinds of time, giving rise to two kinds of experience. The first experience is one in which the present moment has been frozen into eternity, resulting in paradisiacal bliss and vision. This state of happiness cannot be sustained for long: the poet falls back into the other experience, depressing and frightful. He is continuously aware of the clock signalling the minutes of present which are slipping into the past thus ever increasing its pressure. But the experience of escape from *ennui* and the past makes him fondly hope for another opportunity to escape from clock-time. In the poem "Le voyage", he conceives of such an attempt at freedom in the journey of a consciousness made in defiance of time and space,

Nous voulons voyager sans vapeur et sans voile!

Faites, pour égayer l'ennui de nos prisons,<sup>4</sup>

and reaching a different kind of time and of reality. The perception of a time other than that measured by clocks has important and far-reaching implications for Baudelaire. It was a step toward that transcendental reality which was the goal of the Symbolist poets of the time. The Symbolist imagination "dédaigne la représentation nette et lumineuse du monde extérieure,"<sup>5</sup> because it aspired to something beyond the present, the here and now. To Baudelaire, nature was "un forêt de symboles" through which he passed towards a higher

reality. He was convinced that dreams free men from the pressures of clock-time, and give him a glimpse into that reality which is beyond the material world: "le bon sens nous dit que les choses de la terre n'existent que bien peu, et que la vraie réalité n'est que dans les rêves."<sup>6</sup> Thus Baudelaire revolted against Newtonian Physics which regarded the objective world constituted by "the vast mathematical system whose regular motions according to mechanical principles"<sup>7</sup> was the source of our knowledge of reality, and which associated material reality with the common view of time as a linear progression. Baudelaire believed that the poet has a special insight into reality, but that insight tends to get lost or rubbed off when he flows along the stream of time. The monotonous insistence of clock-time induces in him the mood of *ennui*. Baudelaire sought a release from this mood by an emergence into a new time, continuous and eternally present. The consciousness of this new time opens up a vista of things co-existing on parallel planes of reality. We have a glimpse of such a consciousness at work in "La chambre double." The difference between the two kinds of time and of the two kinds of reality is brought out by Baudelaire with great difficulty. He distinguishes, for instance, two conditions, "d'un élément éternel, invariable, dont la qualité est excessivement difficile à déterminer, et d'un élément relatif, circonstanciel."<sup>8</sup> It is interesting to note that later both philosophy and science gave credence to what seemed in Baudelaire mere speculation. The visionary time, of which Baudelaire is not able to give a complete explanation in discursive terms, finds a parallel in Bergson's exposition of *la durée*. The *durée* has no 'before' or 'after'; it is a continuous 'present.' Bergson compares it to music, where each note is separate, yet dependent for its effect on all the other notes, "une phrase musicale qui serait toujours sur le point de finir et sans cesse se modifierait tous sa totalité par l'addition de quelque not nouvelle."<sup>9</sup> The *durée* helps to gather all the experiences we have had, whether we had been conscious of them or not. It arranges all the moments of experience into a simultaneous order (—thus the past becomes present—) which is always in the making.

Bergson distinguished between two faculties in man — intellect and intuition. The former concerns itself with quantitative factors, while the latter enables us to experience everything qualitatively. Intuition gives us access to the *durée*, or what Baudelaire called *le moment*. Reality is what we experience through the *durée*. The *durée* helps the poet to get free from the sense of linear progression in time, and to become aware of the new time in which the divisions of past, present and future yield to a simultaneity in which the *moment* becomes a microcosm of eternity. Such attitudes to reality were latter



strengthened by Einsteinian Physics which posits an extralogical universe where causality and time are no longer certitudes.

It is worth nothing that Baudelaire insists that the disastrous effects of chronological time can be transcended only by utilizing time, by willed action in time and within the limits of the poet's human condition "On ne peut oublier le temps qu'en se'en servant."<sup>10</sup> In our own times Eliot has expressed a similar standpoint when he says, 'Only through time time is conquered.'<sup>11</sup> The journey of the poetic consciousness, in its attempt to conquer time, leads the poet towards the abyss of the Unknown, which he seeks to explore,

Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu'importe ?  
Au fond de l' Inconnu .

But, *le gouffre* did not claim Baudelaire, nor did he get transfixed on its brink. Knowledge of the Unknown was not his goal, but only a step in his attainment of greater understanding of reality. He did not dwell on the *idéal*, like Mallarmé. He was no visionary devoted to absolute reality, nor did he seek to communicate to the reader a vision in all its purity, because, perhaps, he felt, like Eliot later, that "human kind/cannot bear very much reality." Though Baudelaire had an interest in the spiritual, his search for reality was not that of a philosopher or a mystic. His concern with reality was that of an artist, and he was still a man speaking to men. Baudelaire believed that he had no right to cut himself off from life as it is lived by men: "Quiconque n'accepte pas les conditions de la vie, vend son ame." He thus resolutely accepted the actualities, however sordid and painful they might be, and tried to integrate them into his vision. That is why we find in Baudelaire's poetry that curious mixture of spirituality and sordid urban imagery. This may seem paradoxical to the reader. But Baudelaire had a special use for urban imagery, which became a sort of lever to the timeless reality. He found a great deal ugliness, vice, and suffering in the city of Paris which was, in his times, passing through a process of rapid, unplanned industrialization. Baudelaire felt, at one stage of his career, that only by a complete acceptance of the harsh details of the sensuous world, particularly its ugliness and suffering, could he transcend them. His technique of transforming urban images into *états d'ame* which gave him awareness of a deeper reality, added a new dimension to his poetry. As Eliot has said,

"it is not merely in the use of imagery of the sordid life of a great metropolis but in the elevation of such imagery to the first *intensity* — presenting it as it is, and yet making it represent something much more

than itself — that Baudelaire has created a mode of release and expression for other men.”<sup>12</sup>

Both Laforgue and Eliot were strongly influenced by Baudelaire in their use of urban imagery.

Baudelaire's experiments in defying time and in transcending the sensorial details of city life resulted in other new techniques too, and provided the basis for a new aesthetic. We have, for instance, the simultaneity of the Symbolist poem in place of the sequence of narrative poetry. Instead of events following one another, one after the other, thus implying an order representing past, present, and future, we have the extended moment of modern poems. In W.B. Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium", for instance, the journey of the soul leads to the song of the golden bird which comprises "what is past, or passing, or to come" and blends them into the simultaneous order of the "artifice of eternity". In T.S.Eliot's "The Waste Land", Tiresias finds a continuity of past, present, and future, for he has "foresuffered all." That is the Baudelairean *moment*, and that — what Tiresias sees — is as Eliot tells us in a note, "the substance of the poem," The simultaneity of past, present, and future, and the intensity of images in "The Waste Land" has suggested to many readers its likeness to dream or nightmare. The simultaneous order and intensity of dream was deliberately sought by Baudelaire. "Le reve," according to him, gives the poet "un puissance superieure" which leaps to a profound awareness:

Le reve, absurde, imprevu sans rapport ni connexion avec la caractère, vie et les passions du dormeur! ce reve... represente, le cote surnaturel de la vie.<sup>13</sup>

Baudelaire's "la reve", which he associates with the spiritual aspect of man's life, is not to be confused with Freud's dream-activity of the subconscious. It is a combination of mental and perceptual activities. That is why Baudelaire speaks of conscious dreaming with full awareness. "La reve", with the poet fully in command, induces a growth or movement towards a state of mind in which experience and awareness of experience become one. Thus, dream became one of the avenues leading to Reality.

The chief purpose of Baudelaire's experiments with time was to go beyond the sequential imperatives of action ('and then, and then') to the eternal present ('the now, now, now') of consciousness. Baudelaire's search for the continuum of reality can also be seen as a quest for the paradisaical. "The end of art," says Northrop Frye, "is the recovery of paradise."<sup>14</sup> The quest for paradise may be related to Christian lapsarian doctrines of the loss of innocence,

or of what Baudelaire has referred to as loss of "le vert paradis des amours enfantine." ('Moesta et Errabunda') The fall from the paradisaical state can also be interpreted in mythic terms. Myth distinguishes between "sacred" and "profane" time. The first is associated with the world of perfection, the second with the world of history. Myth too refers to a fall of man from sacred into profane time as a result of displeasing some divine being.<sup>15</sup> Man always seeks to recover sacred time. Baudelaire may be regarded as exemplifying such a search.

### Notes and References

1. Charles Baudelaire, "L' horloge", from *Les Fleurs du mal*, p.320. (Trans.): "The clock! a god sinister, frightful, impossible,/Whose finger menacingly points to us: 'remember.'"
2. Baudelaire, "Enivrez-vous", from *Spleen de Paris*, p.226. (Trans.): "the gloomy and vigilant enemy,/Time!"
3. Baudelaire, "Le Chambre Double," from *The Penguin Book of French Verse*, Book 3, pages 176-178; (Trans.): "The pieces of furniture have shapes stretched out, prostrate, languid. The pieces of furniture have the air of dreaming; one would say they were endowed with a sleep-walker's life....Here everything has the sufficient light and the delectable darkness of harmony."
4. Baudelaire, "Le Voyage", from *The Penguin Book*, 3,p.175, (Trans.) "Let us go on a voyage without steam or sail,/Made to escape from the ennus of our prisons."
5. Theodule Ribot, *Essai sur l' imagination creatrice*, (Paris, 1900), p.369. (Trans.): "disdains the exact and luminous representation of the external world."
6. Baudelaire, *Œuvres complètes*, (Paris, 1968), p.345 - referred to henceforth as OC. Trans. "Commonsense tells us that the things of the earth exist but very little, and that true reality lies only in dreams."
7. E.A.Burtt, "The Metaphysical Foundations of Science", quoted by Basil Willey, in *The Seventeenth Century Background*, Peregrine Books, p.18.
8. Baudelaire, *L'art romantique* p.210: trans. "of an element eternal, invariable, whose quality is extremely difficult to determine, and of an element relative, circumstantial."
9. Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données Immediates*, p.89. Trans. "a musical phrase which was always on the

point of completion, but was modified in the totality of the composition by the addition of each new note."

10. Baudelaire, *Mon coeur mis a nu*, OC, p.1234; trans. "One cannot forget time, within which we work."
11. T.S. Eliot, *Burnt Norton*, II, 90.
12. T.S. Eliot *Selected Essays*, (Faber), p.426.
13. Baudelaire, *Fuées*, OC, p.1136; trans. "Dream, absurd and unexpected,
14. Northrop Frye, *Fearful Symmetry*, (Princeton), p.371.
15. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, London, 1964. Also, *Myths, Rites, Symbols-A Mircea Eliade Reader*, edited by W. C. Beame and W. G. Doty, (Harper & Row), 1976

Department of English  
South Gujarat University  
Surat, Gujarat, India.

## BOOK REVIEWS

Arthur C. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981, 212 Pages.

Arthur Danto's ideas have exerted considerable influence in aesthetics over the last two decades; indeed, he is one of the philosophers who has helped to define the field in its current form. *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* comments upon two of the central issues now framing philosophy of art: the analysis of representation and definition of art. Danto re-opened the question of the definability of art some years ago in the wake of widespread post-Wittgensteinian opinion that art is an indefinable concept, and this early work inspired most notably George Dickie's "institutional" analysis of art. Because Danto's concept of the "artworld" is a progenitor of the now-famous institutional theory, it is likely that the definitional question will stand out as the major topic of this book. However, Danto develops his argument in a way that reveals the close relation between the concept of art and the problems of representation and imitation, and it is in this connection that the distinctive and subtle aspects of his thinking are brought into focus.

The theme unifying the many subjects covered in the book is the problem of "indiscernibility," which Danto casts as an aspect of an issue he considers at the

very root of philosophical thinking: the distinction between appearance and reality. When one has two or more objects that "look" the same but that possess different aesthetic qualities, then one is confronted with an ontological difference that cannot be discerned by mere perception. It is this difference that must be investigated to analyze the relationship of representation and subject and to understand the essential difference between art and reality, or--to use Danto's terms--"artworks" and "real things."

That indiscernibility is the problem leading to a theory of art indicates the kind of art that acts as a model for that theory. The current debate over the definability of art typically pits proposed definitions against the most recalcitrant examples of artworks, that appear to have least in common with the traditions and established genres of art. Thus Dada, conceptualism, Pop Art, and the like are schools of art that repeatedly test and shape a theory. Danto believes that it is such examples as Andy Warhol's "Brillo Box" that stimulate philosophical thinking about art—not because they look like paradigm cases of artworks, but precisely because they do not! Artworks indiscernible from real things make it obvious that we cannot found a definition of art on whatever qualities an object presents to the senses.

Real and hypothetical examples liberally illustrate this point. Several manageable instances of the former are

provided by the Dadaist movement of the early twentieth century, when iconoclasts like Marcel Duchamp submitted for exhibition such mundane objects as urinals and snowshovel. The snowshovel-artwork is indiscernible from an ordinary showshovel used to clear the side-walk, but the critical discourse appropriate to each reveals their difference. While the ordinary showshovel has no artistically relevant aesthetic qualities, the artwork is aptly described as "witty" and "irreverent," interpretive predicates suggested by another distinctive feature-its possession of a title ("In Advance of the Broken Arm").

What artworks have that other things lack is an "artworld," an atmosphere of theory and history that guides the viewer to perceive the work as something more than its mere "material counterpart." One hesitates to paraphrase too briefly Danto's elusive and provocative ideas about the concept of art, for they are presented gradually and persuasively throughout many chapters and are as much evoked as formulated. Two points must serve here to suggest Danto's full theory: one has to do with analysis of imitation and representation, in which discussion he takes issue with current analysis of representation, notably Nelson Goodman's. Danto argues that no matter what the genre, medium, or style, art is always *about* some subject. This is not to say that he reduces all artistic forms to imitations, for "about" is a generous word designed to capture the commonality of all the varieties of relationships art bears to reality. (It is what

Duchamp's snowshovel is about, for example, that endows it with qualities distinct from those of its indiscernible counterpart in the real world.) Secondly, the perception of a work of art *as art* requires that it be constituted as such by a viewer sufficiently versed in artistic tradition and theory to interpret it. "To interpret a work is to offer a theory as to what the work is about, what its subject is." (p.119) Unless one is able to see a work of art as art and not merely as a material object, one is unable to discern its artistic qualities.

There are numerous other thought-provoking aspects of this book. It profoundly challenges accepted ways of analyzing the nature of aesthetic qualities, and what Danto claims to be ontological distinctions between indiscernible objects will doubtless engender debate and consternation. Perhaps of most general interest are his speculations about the origins of philosophy, which he hazards originated in the ancient civilizations of Greece and India in connection with the development of imitative art and a consequent obsession with the difference between appearance and reality. Like all daring and original works, this one is full of controversial points, making it lively and stimulating reading as well as the locus of important theory.

Carolyn Korsmeyer

F. David, Martin, *Sculpture and Enlivened Space*  
The University Press of Kentucky (1981)

This book makes a strong case for the autonomy of sculpture as an art from

independent especially of painting and of the visual and conceptual constraints of that art. The author is relentless in his repetition that sculpture, unlike painting, exists in and enlivens real space, which it shares with the observer. Painting, by contrast, produces an imaginary space into which the observer may enter.

Martin explains the historic neglect of sculpture in terms of two related traditions that have pervaded mainstream western thinking. The first affirms the superiority of vision over the other senses as that faculty which controls most while maintaining the greatest distance from its object. Only audition is of comparable merit, and the tactile sense, which entails contact, is the least meritorious. The second doctrine represents cognitive, including perceptual experience as a subject-object relationship in which a datum is "given to" and interpreted by an active subject. On this view not merely the identification of things, but also judgments of their distance, depth and volume are made inferentially on the basis of visual clues.

Martin defends a phenomenological theory of experience associated with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. He argues that "primary perception" is a pre-abstractive experience by an embodied being which perceives its body as a "center of action", which emerges as co-present with experienced "poles of action". Things emerge or "show forth" in the world, bringing space with them, in an active and reciprocal encounter. "Secondary perception" is the "thinking at" an object which identifies and places it in a largely utilitarian

context. In aesthetic experience, subject and object remain merged. There is a primary sense of "withness" as the thing manifests itself fully, bodying forth, while self-consciousness as subject is anaesthetized. The perceiver and perceived lose their separate identity and emerge as polarities within the process of perception.

The ultimate goal of sculpture is, according to Martin, to reveal our unity with things, a truth often, forgotten in the press of modern living. Sculpture achieves that goal by adhering to two imperatives: "Attend to the impacting between", the enlivened space which enhances the physicality of both observer and work; and "Bring out spetial withness!" which reinforces the sense of priomordial unity.

Martin is at his best when describing concrete works of art, especially those which do not meet with his approval either because of sculpture imperfection (e.g., Canova's *Perseue Holding the Head of Medusa* or because of there inappropriate location (e.g., Donatello's *Mary Magdalence*). He is a remarkably acute perceiver and has the ability to evoke a kinaesthetic consciousness even through the written word. Regrettably most of the photographs in the book are not of sufficient quality to serve as more than mnemonic devices, and therefore Martin's extensive descriptions carry a heavy translational borden.

The book is not strong on theory, but it makes an implicit historic claim that sculpture has undergone a progression from primarily planner to radial organization,

best exemplified in the "democratic all-roundedness" of Giovanni da Bologna's *Rape of the Sabines* (1579—83). This work, Martin says, achieves a kind of "Copernican Revolution", a complete centeredness from an inner core, radiating outward in all directions such that the observer is forced to orbit around it as the earth around the sun. Painting, by contrast, requires that the observer find and maintain the specific privileged position to which the painting addresses itself.

*Sculpture and Enlivened Space* is to be recommended as a good introduction to the art of sculpture. Its sensitive descriptions merit attention regardless of the author's more tendentious speculations. It may contribute to the further exploration of an area of aesthetic inquiry which, as Professor Martin rightly notes, has been unwarrantably neglected.

Hilde Hein  
College of the holy cross

Jeffrey H. Tigay. *The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic* University of Pennsylvania Press (Philadelphia), 1982.

Ancient Near Eastern literature is rather beyond the bounds of both comparative literature and philosophy, forming as it does the basis for a separate scholarly discipline with its own methodology and exotic language study. Nevertheless, literary scholars and philosophers sometimes find themselves drawn to these very early written works which are situated at the interface of the prehistoric and the historic,

between what has not yet been articulated and what has been given expression. These earliest poetic products such as the "Gilgamesh Epic" seem to hold a secret about the birth of literary imagination and rational thought. Jeffrey Tigay's *The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic* can assist the nonspecialist who is drawn to this sometimes forbidding field and who wishes to study "the most important literary creation of the whole of ancient Mesopotamia."

The work is a highly detailed analysis of the epic and of its stages of development from the separate Sumerian tales told about King Gilgamesh late in the third millennium B.C.E. to the Akkadian Late Version of the epic discovered at several first millennium sites. Archaeological discoveries of tablets which represent several historical stages of the story allow the unusual opportunity to compare versions of an epic with one another and to investigate the changing cultural milieu as it is reflected in each of the stages. Tigay traces the changes from one stage of the story to another for over two thousand years, looking at small scale variations in words and phrases and formulas, as well as larger scale alterations in the roles of characters and in the episodes and themes that are emphasized. An aspect of this study which is perhaps not so surprising is that in documenting the history of the "Gilgamesh Epic" Tigay is simultaneously documenting the history of scholarship about the epic. This feature of the work is interesting in itself and it makes this a helpful book for beginning a serious examination of the



"Gilgamesh Epic"; one will determine quite readily from the text and the extensive footnotes what the leading names and works are in this field.

Another feature of the work which recommends it to interested non-specialists and to specialists is the lengthy and impressive bibliography which is provided, since it forms an excellent reference source on the epic. Students of ancient Near Eastern languages will be glad, too, to see that Tigay generally incorporates original language passages in the text; English translation is also offered, except in the Appendix and footnotes.

In addition to an analysis of the historical development of the poem, Tigay also undertakes an exegesis of each of the major sections of the Gilgamesh poem. These interpretive chapters (Chaps. 7—12) are not as strong as they might be. While Tigay is technical and precise in his historical and philological chapters, his interpretations of the poem's themes tend to be discontinuous and to lack zest and imagination. Thorkild Jacobsen's *The Treasures of Darkness* (Yale University Press, 1976) develops more comprehensive reading of the "Gilgamesh Epic" as a whole, especially with respect to the poem's social context.

Regarding the epic's ritual associations, however, the present work offers some valuable historical information, for example that Gilgamesh was worshipped in magical rituals as a judge of the netherworld, and that ancient tradition attributed

the epic to an exorcist-priest, Sin-leqi-unninni. Tigay also notes episodes in the text which suggest ritual activity, and phrases and formulas which point to royal inscriptions and hymns and incantations. The connections that Tigay points out between the epic and magical and/or sacred practice are possibly the most fascinating discussions in the book.

*The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic* is not at all for the casual reader, but it is a fine reference source for those who wish to learn about this very ancient poem.

Daryl McGowan

Geoffrey Strickland, *Structuralism or Criticism? Thoughts on how we read*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, paperback 1983, x + 209 pp.

The book is divided into three parts. The first consists of a critique of structuralism as applied to literary criticism, particularly to the question: 'What happens when we read?' It shows how post-Saussurean structuralism with its commitment to a closed system of literary signs undervalues the subtlety and skill of the ordinary reader and makes claims to a 'science of literature which remains only a theoretical goal. As a result, the structuralist reading of literary works is no less fallible than the unsystematic procedures of the ordinary reader.

The second part, by far the longest, is a detailed analysis of the prusuppotihieros of

the ordinary reading. The reader makes certain assumptions, correct or otherwise, concerning the intention of the writer and that is why his reading, while being true, does not deny the possibility of being wrong. A true understanding of writing does not imply a complete sharing of the writer's experience and precisely for this, it is possible to have a true understanding of writers whose experiences differ so much from our own. Understanding a work of literature entails understanding its interest and importance for the writer which inevitably affects the interest and importance of the work for the reader. Hence, interpretation and evaluation are the same and the student of literature is also a student of history.

The difference, thus drawn between structuralism and criticism is illustrated in the third part through a discussion of the achievements of Roland Barthes and F. R. Leavis as critics. Barthes' utopian pursuit of a 'science' of literature leads him to equate costume and fashion, cinema and commercial fiction with serious literary works. And in his strictly critical writings, Barthes' 'artifice of reading' is as conventional as any one's. In contrast, Leavis comes out to be a better guide to literature in spite of his unsystematicness and lack of an 'artifice'. The book is, thus, a indication of criticism, 'the common pursuit of true judgement' in literature, against the challenges put forward by the all-encompassing claims of structuralism. While there is nothing new in the main thesis of the book, it is to

the credit of Strickland that he ranges over a wide field of English and French thoughts on literary theory to produce an extremely civilized and provocative work on reading.

H. Panda

S. K. Saxena, *The Winged Form: aesthetic essays on Hindustani rhythm*, Sangeet Natak Akademi, New Delhi, 1979, pp iv + 165 + iii. *Aesthetic Essays: Studies in Aesthetics, Hindustani Music and Kathak Dance*, Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1981, pp. ix + 247.

Both the works are brilliant examples of genuine thinking, profound experience, seasoned argument and remarkable clarity in communicating the abstract speculations on arts and theories of art. The method followed is comparative and the purpose is to interpret and theorize Indian arts and art experience with particular reference to Hindustani (North Indian) music and Kathak dance in the light of contemporary western aesthetics which runs along two main lines: the linguistic-analytic and phenomenological. The author's approach in both cases is mostly phenomenological in the sense that he establishes his views not merely by offering arguments on the basis of abstract logical analysis of statements about arts but by referring to the actual facts of art contemplation.

In their concept of 'Rasa' the ancient Indians proposed a theory of art experience as a kind of direct perception — an act of tasting or *āsvādana* suggesting the

view that the experience and criticism or or critical awareness of a work of art are virtually the same act — a view which T. S. Eliot presented confusingly in his concept of criticism (1956) as the simultaneous acts of understanding and enjoyment of art. This appears to be the key-point in Professor Saxena's interpretation of the arts and theories of arts both the volumes.

In the *Winged Form* he establishes the independent status of Hindustani rhythm. Traditionally there are two Sanskrit terms referring to music — *gānam* (lit. song) and *Saṅgītam* (lit. well - sung). The latter is defined as a form of art that is an organic unity of dance and both instrumental and vocal music. In this form of music language plays no role or just an insignificant one whereas the former is the singing of a verbal composition with (or sometimes without) a musical instrument (of. the Hamsapadikā *gānam* in Kālidāsa's *Śākuntalam* Act VI). *Saṅgītam* is held to be superior to *gānam* because of its completeness in expressing an emotion and sophistication as a form of art. But the word functioning as a synecdoche also refers to the vocal music with(or without) the accompaniment of musical instruments. It is in this sense that the term is mostly used in the treatises of music such as those of Maṭaṅga, Pārśva-deva, Śārṅgadeva and Śubhanikara. This music has two features *tāla* and *ālāpa*. *Tāla* or rhythm is the musical duration as measured by beats *ālāpa* is singing without words and rhythmic accompaniments

(differing from *gānam*). Now, accepting of 'tasting' as a criterion of completeness an artwork, the author argues that if *ālāpa* because of its 'tastability' is accepted as an independent art form (even without dance) why should *tāla* for the same reason, be not accepted as an independent art form ?

The author demonstrates further that the primary creation of rhythm is automatic and articulate symmetry of pure pace. Both the epithets are borrowed from the aesthetics of Susanne Langer. But at the same time Saxena observes, there are several concepts in Western aesthetics such as embodiment, symbol and expression which are irrelevant in the interpretation of Hindustani music that is neither an embodiment, nor a symbol, nor expressive in Langer's sense of the terms.

The chapters 2-7 are refreshingly new in their correlation of Crocean aesthetics with Indian musicology, phenomenological analysis of the structure and analytical studies of form and content and asymmetrical rhythm of our music. Saxena argues with great cogency that the Crocean concept of expression appears insufficient when applied to explain our *ālāpa* singing. Our aesthetics approves of a correlation of the expression and communication theories. Similarly, the essay on form and content in the Hindustani rhythm is also remarkably new in the interpretation of Indian music. The author applies Langer's concept of Organic unity of form and content in artworks: "Content is what appears organized and form means that or how it is organized in a work of art," Outside the

the work of art content is mere material. This is illustrated by the difference that exists between a *tritāl thekā* and its sixteen *mātrās* or sound units.

The 9th chapter is devoted to the role of rhythm in dance with special reference to the Kathak variety and in the second volume *Aesthetical Essays* this variety is interpreted in the light of Langer's theory of dance as a symbolic form expressive of human feelings. The special attractions of this volume are the essays on aesthetic attitude and interpretation of Indian art in the light of aesthetics of Kant and Hegel. There is an elaborate discussion on the aesthetics of Hindustani music as well.

The current debate over the reality of a specific kind of attitude in perceiving art works among philosophers like Stolnitz, Dickie, Hospers and many others is stimulating. While Stolnitz advocates an aesthetic attitude "a disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone" Dickie refuses to accept its existence and Hospers while accepting such an attitude in case of judgement fails to understand its function in case of perception of an artwork. But Saxena in defence of Stolnitz

refutes the views of Dickie, Hospers, Coleman, Snoeyenbos and others. Here again, the arguments are based on the practical experience of artworks especially Hindustani music, and, by implication, on the concepts of *tāṭasthya* and *Sādhārāṇī karaṇa* as propounded by our ancient aestheticians. Both the concepts emphasize an unselfish, impersonal and indeliberate, generalized or detached attitude of the perceiver of an artwork. Without this attitude there would be personal involvement and attachment which must hamper the 'tasting' of the artwork leading necessarily toward a failure in evaluation or critical judgement. The same methodology may be noted in the essay on Hegel where he directs our attention to the Hegelian view of art as an exemplification of 'symbolic form'.

In spite of the technical language essential for the writings of this highly advanced order the volumes are readable for their accuracy in presentation and extraordinary clarity in conceptualization.

They are significant contributions to the contemporary writings on comparative aesthetics.

A. C. Sukla